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THE GEOGRAPHY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
LITIGATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY 
GOVERNANCE 
HARI M. OSOFSKY*
ABSTRACT 
This Article aims to forward the dialogue about transnational 
regulatory governance through a law and geography analysis of climate 
change litigation. Part II begins by considering fundamental barriers to 
responsible transnational energy production. Part III proposes a place-
based approach to dissecting climate change litigation and a model for 
understanding its spatial implications. Parts IV through VI map 
representative examples of climate change litigation in subnational, 
national, and supranational fora. The Article concludes by exploring the 
normative implications of this descriptive geography; it engages the 
intersection of international law, international relations, and geography as 
a jumping-off point for a companion article.  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1791 
II. CHALLENGES TO RESPONSIBLE TRANSNATIONAL ENERGY 
PRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1795 
A. Nature of the Transnational Energy Production Process ..... 1796 
B. Corporations in the International Legal System ................... 1797 
 * Visiting Assistant Professor (2005–06), Assistant Professor (2006–), University of Oregon 
School of Law; B.A., J.D., Yale University. This Article benefited greatly from feedback at 
presentations at the 2005 Law and Society Annual Meeting, 2005 International Law Weekend, 
University of Michigan Ross School of Business, University of Mississippi School of Law, University 
of New Mexico School of Law, University of Oregon School of Law, and University of the Pacific 
McGeorge School of Law; in particular, I would like to thank my co-panelists Rebecca Bratspies, 
William C.J. Burns, Donald Goldberg, Rebecca Hardin, Amy Sinden, and Andrew Strauss for their 
insights. I am very grateful to Keith Aoki for teaching me that geography goes far beyond what I 
missed in the 4th grade; his mentoring on this piece has been invaluable. I also am appreciative of the 
helpful commentary and contributions provided by Paul Berman, Charles H. Brower II, Richard 
Hildreth, Alexander Murphy, Austen Parrish, Peter Roderick, Leila Nadya Sadat, Eleanor Stein, 
Stephanie Stern, and David Zaring, as well as of Brianna Tindall’s excellent research assistance. 
Finally, I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Washington University Law Quarterly, 
especially Karen Piotrowski, Sasha Polonsky, Cynthia Ricks, and Teri Dent, for their thoughtful and 
patient assistance on the piece. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1789 Osofsky book pages.doc8/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1790 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1789 
 
 
 
 
C. Overlapping Regulatory Regimes ......................................... 1800 
III. LOCATING PLACE AND SPACE IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION.. 1802 
A. Connections to Place............................................................. 1804 
1. Geography of Actors...................................................... 1804 
a. Petitioners.............................................................. 1805 
b. Respondents ........................................................... 1806 
c. Adjudicators........................................................... 1807 
2. Geography of Claims..................................................... 1808 
a. Facts ...................................................................... 1809 
b. Substantive Law..................................................... 1810 
c. Procedural Law ..................................................... 1811 
B. Spatial Implications............................................................... 1813 
1. Multiscalar: Supranational, National, and Subnational1814 
2. Multibranch: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial ........ 1816 
3. Multiactor: Governmental and Nongovernmental ........ 1817 
IV. MAPPING SUBNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION .............. 1818 
A. Environmental Cost Valuation: Challenge to the Minnesota 
Scheme................................................................................... 1819 
1. Actors............................................................................. 1819 
2. Claims............................................................................ 1822 
B. Environmental Review: Expansion of Coal-Based Energy in 
Victoria, Australia................................................................. 1822 
1. Actors............................................................................. 1823 
2. Claims............................................................................ 1825 
C. Geography of Subnational Cases .......................................... 1825 
V. MAPPING NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION...................... 1827 
A. Emissions Regulation: U.S. Power Companies..................... 1827 
1. Actors............................................................................. 1828 
2. Claims............................................................................ 1829 
B. Emissions Regulation: U.S. Vehicles .................................... 1829 
1. Actors............................................................................. 1830 
2. Claims............................................................................ 1834 
C. Emissions Regulation: Nigerian Oil Companies’ Gas 
Flaring................................................................................... 1835 
1. Actors............................................................................. 1836 
2. Claims............................................................................ 1838 
D. Project Finance: U.S. Agency Assistance for Overseas 
Projects ................................................................................. 1838 
1. Actors............................................................................. 1839 
2. Claims............................................................................ 1839 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/3
p1789 Osofsky book pages.doc8/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] THE GEOGRAPHY OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 1791 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Project Finance: German Agency Assistance for Overseas 
Projects ................................................................................. 1840 
1. Actors............................................................................. 1841 
2. Claims............................................................................ 1841 
F. Geography of National Cases ............................................... 1842 
VI. MAPPING SUPRANATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION.......... 1843 
A. International Human Rights: Inuit Petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.............................. 1843 
1. Actors............................................................................. 1844 
2. Claims............................................................................ 1844 
B. World Heritage Preservation: Danger List Petitions to the 
World Heritage Committee ................................................... 1845 
1. Actors............................................................................. 1847 
2. Claims............................................................................ 1850 
C. Geography of Supranational Cases ...................................... 1850 
VII. TOWARDS A REGULATORY MODEL............................................... 1851 
A. Transnational Litigative Spaces............................................ 1852 
B. Key Actors and Litigative Spaces.......................................... 1853 
C. Identity and Culture .............................................................. 1854 
VIII. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS......................................................... 1855 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2005, Sheila Watt-Cloutier with the support of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference filed a petition with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights against the United States claiming that its 
climate change policy violates the Inuit’s human rights.1 The petition 
argues that despite U.S. responsibility for a substantial percentage of the 
world’s greenhouse gas emissions, it has failed to develop adequate 
policies to limit its emissions.2  
The problems that this petition addresses are well documented. The 
recently released report of the key findings of the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment details the rapidity and severity of climate change in the 
 1. See Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from 
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States 
(submitted Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/reports/ICC_Human_ 
Rights_Petition.pdf [hereinafter Inuit Petition]; see also Press Release, Earthjustice, Inuit Leader 
Sheila Watt-Cloutier Announces Intention to File a Human Rights Claim (Dec. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.earthjustice.org/news/display.html?ID=935.  
 2. Inuit Petition, supra note 1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1789 Osofsky book pages.doc8/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1792 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1789 
 
 
 
 
 
 
region;3 average temperature increases, for example, are at almost twice 
the global rate.4 The impacts on the Inuit from the environmental changes 
include threats to homes from storms and melting permafrost, to livelihood 
from changes in animal populations, to life from thinning ice that makes 
traditional travel routes more dangerous, and to culture from the 
combination of these and other changes with increased navigation through 
major marine routes.5
A geography of the actors in this case is dizzying. The Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference (ICC) is a regional organization representing 
Inuit peoples who live in the Arctic, an area which cross-cuts several 
existing national borders.6 The Inuit represented by the ICC have 
multiscalar ties to place, ranging from their local communities to regional 
and international organizations and governmental bodies. The respondent 
is a large nation-state, the United States, but many of the criticized 
greenhouse gas emissions emanate from corporations with ties to 
particular U.S. states, as well as to several other nation-states. The 
adjudicator is the Inter-American Commission, which is a regional body 
composed of individuals from several nation-states—partly overlapping 
with the Arctic nation-states—acting in a regional capacity. Claims to the 
Commission draw from regional human rights law, which this petition 
applies to circumstances that connect geographically disparate localities—
the ones in which emissions occur and the ones in which the climate 
change impacts are experienced—due to a process that occurs in the 
atmosphere around the globe.7
This Article analyzes the Inuit petition and other examples of climate 
change litigation from a law and geography perspective, with the aim of 
understanding their implications for transnational regulatory governance.8 
 3. SUSAN JOY HASSOL, ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, IMPACTS OF A WARMING 
ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 2004, available at http://www.amap.no/acia/index. 
html. 
 4. Id. at 8. 
 5. Id. at 16–17. 
 6. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=16&Lang= 
En (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). “The organization holds Consultative Status II at the United Nations.” 
Id. 
 7. For a more in-depth discussion of the actors in the case, see infra Part VI.B.1. 
 8. This Article is the second in a series exploring characterization issues that occur at 
international environmental intersections. The first article, Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from 
Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71 
(2005), developed a model and applied it to a series of case studies in order to propose a more 
systematic approach to international environmental rights advocacy. My observation of the state-
corporate regulatory dynamic in those cases provided the inspiration for this Article. After completing 
a companion piece that explores the normative implications of the geography of climate change 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/3
p1789 Osofsky book pages.doc8/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] THE GEOGRAPHY OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 1793 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This type of litigation provides a particularly interesting example of 
adjudication to address energy production’s externalities9 because it 
engages multiscalar contributions to a supranational atmospheric process 
that causes multiscalar impacts over time. The movement from local to 
global to local through various governmental regulatory structures infuses 
the relationships among those contributing to and suffering from climate 
change with an unusual richness. Moreover, those impacted by climate 
change have brought actions in a wide range of judicial fora, which allows 
for comparative analysis of tribunals’ approaches to these multilayered 
situations.  
Although the existing scholarly literature analyzes international 
regulation of corporations in general,10 and climate change11 and 
environmental rights litigation12 in particular, these discussions focus 
litigation, I plan to focus future articles in the series on the intersections of trade and the environment, 
natural disaster and the environment, and armed conflict and the environment. 
 9. This Article focuses predominantly on the externality of climate change and its impacts. 
Some of the cases it analyzes, however, focus on other externalities as well. For example, the Nigerian 
gas flaring case also engages the health impacts of the toxins being released. See infra note 65. 
 10. See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 309 (2004) (exploring the role that corporate social responsibility could play in international 
regulation of corporations); Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and 
International Law: Where from Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2003) (considering the inadequacy of 
existing international regulatory mechanisms and proposing a new one); Janelle M. Diller, On the 
Possibilities and Limitations of NGO Participation in International Law and Its Processes: Corporate 
Applications, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 304 (2001) (analyzing the current and potential role of 
NGOs in global corporate governance); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The 
Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 
931 (2004) (exploring direct international-level regulation of transnational corporations); Joel R. Paul, 
Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible Under International Law, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 285 (2001) (introducing a symposium issue on transnational corporate liability).  
 11. See, e.g., William C.G. Burns, The Exigencies that Drive Potential Causes of Action for 
Climate Change Damages at the International Level, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 223 (2004) 
(introducing litigative efforts to compel more rigorous greenhouse gas emissions reductions); Richard 
W. Thackeray, Jr., Note, Struggling for Air: The Kyoto Protocol, Citizens’ Suits Under the Clean Air 
Act, and the United States’ Options for Addressing Global Climate Change, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 855, 884–98 (2004) (describing various citizen suits aimed at forcing changes in U.S. climate 
change policy). 
 12. See, e.g., Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a Proxy for 
Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2003) (discussing human rights claims as 
proxies for environmental claims under the current Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) jurisprudence); 
Linda A. Malone & Scott Pasternack, Exercising Environmental Human Rights and Remedies in the 
United Nations System, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 365 (2002) (describing how 
environmental rights claims can be filed in the United Nations system); Deborah Schaaf & Julie 
Fishel, Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 
Victory for Indian Land Rights and the Environment, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 175 (2002) (discussing the 
implications of Dann v. United States, Case No. 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 113/01 (2001)); Mariana T. 
Acevedo, Student Article, The Intersection of Human Rights and Environmental Protection in the 
European Court of Human Rights, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 437 (2000) (considering Guerra and Others v. 
Italy, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 (1998) in the context of European Court of Human Rights environmental 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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primarily on specific litigative or regulatory approaches as tools for 
achieving corporate responsibility.13 To the extent that state sovereignty 
and authority are analyzed in the context of multinational corporate 
responsibility, pieces tend to debate their limitations in light of the growth 
of non-state-based actors and regulatory mechanisms.14
This piece builds upon that literature by arguing that climate change 
litigation represents a modified Westphalian15 geography, in which the 
nation-state still plays a core role but must navigate a three-dimensional 
spatial terrain. An analysis of individual subnational, national, and 
supranational cases provides a nuanced demonstration of the multiscalar 
places and spaces16 that this geography entails,17 and provides a basis for 
rights jurisprudence); Jennifer A. Amiott, Note, Environment, Equality, and Indigenous Peoples’ Land 
Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of 
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 32 ENVTL. L. 873 (2002) (providing an overview of The Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Case No. 79, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Ser. C (2001)). For broader 
overviews of the intersection of human rights and the environment, see RUCHI ANAND, 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH DIMENSION (2004) (exploring the 
environmental justice implications of international environmental problems); HUMAN RIGHTS & THE 
ENVIRONMENT (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2002) (exploring cases studies that represent conflicts at the 
intersection of human rights and the environment); HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996) (exploring the extent to which human 
rights law can help forward environmental protection); LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003) (exploring various issues at the 
intersection of human rights and the environment). 
 13. See sources cited supra notes 10–12. 
 14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra note 27 and accompanying text. For further 
law and geography perspectives, see sources cited infra note 40.  
 15. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 16. These terms are used in a variety of contexts in the scholarly literature, often with variant 
meanings as their core focus. Compare DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL 
GEOGRAPHY 369 (2001) (using conceptions of space to engage movement of capital as part of a 
Marxist critique) with Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial 
Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONTRACT 
81, 107 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996) (providing a discussion of the spatial 
structure of the international economy that includes financial and business networks, as well as legal 
structures). For a thoughtful analysis of the need to reengage the concept of space in our globalizing 
world, see DOREEN MASSEY, FOR SPACE (2005). In this piece, I am primarily focused on legal spaces, 
although I acknowledge the broader spatial context in which legal spaces evolve:  
Our legal lives are constituted by shifting intersections of different and not necessarily 
coherently articulating legal orders associated with different scalar spaces. The relations 
between these different legal spaces is a dynamic and complex one, but it is a pressing and 
important subject of inquiry given the ways in which the codes operative at various scales 
intermingle. 
David Delaney, Richard T. Ford & Nicholas Blomley, Preface: Where is Law?, in THE LEGAL 
GEOGRAPHIES READER xiii, xxi (Nicholas Blomley, David Delany & Richard T. Ford eds., 2001). To 
that end, in this Article, I am using “place” to connote ties to particular geographic locations, “scale” 
to engage the applicable level of governance (e.g., subnational, national, supranational), and “space” to 
describe socio-political and legal structures. 
 17. Some scholars have argued that geographic ties are becoming less important in the face of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/3
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further reflections on transnational regulatory governance. This Article’s 
approach is thus primarily descriptive, but its final parts introduce a 
normative inquiry that will form the basis for a future companion article.  
Part II begins by exploring the foundational challenges to effective 
regulation of the energy industry’s externalities. Part III proposes a place-
based approach to dissecting climate change litigation and a model for 
understanding its spatial implications. Parts IV through VI apply this 
model to specific case examples of litigation regarding global climate 
change occurring in subnational, national, and supranational regional and 
international fora. Part VII begins an engagement of the normative 
implications of this terrain, situating it at the intersection of international 
law, international relations, and geography. The Article concludes by 
arguing that effective transnational regulation requires an engagement of 
this geography and suggesting next steps for this inquiry. 
II. CHALLENGES TO RESPONSIBLE TRANSNATIONAL ENERGY 
PRODUCTION 
The vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions are caused by energy-
related activities.18 This Part provides the context in which climate change 
litigation is occurring by exploring foundational challenges to responsible 
transnational energy production. First, the structure of the energy 
production process reinforces the creation of numerous social and 
environmental externalities. Second, the corporations which produce and 
use the energy have an uncertain status in the international legal system. 
Finally, the multiscalar nature of the industry creates overlapping 
regulatory authority.  
globalization. In the context of international environmental law, for example, Christopher Stone has 
made this argument. See Christopher D. Stone, Locale and Legitimacy in International Environmental 
Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1279 (1996). The nuances of that theoretical debate are beyond the scope of 
this Article, which focuses on demonstrating the value of a law and geography approach through 
applying it to the example of climate change. I am in the process of developing a broader piece with 
Alexander Murphy that makes an argument for why international law needs geography and engages 
this literature more directly. 
 18. “As the largest source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 from fossil fuel combustion 
has accounted for nearly 80 percent of GWP weighted emissions since 1990.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, EPA 430-R-05-003, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–
2003 ES-6 (2005). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Nature of the Transnational Energy Production Process 
The first challenge stems from the nature of the energy production 
process, which has multiscalar ties to place. Energy resources are extracted 
from a particular locality by corporate entities that may represent multiple 
nationalities, under the supervision of subnational and national regulatory 
agencies.19  
This structure provides for complex interactions among entities that 
occupy variant and overlapping geopolitical spaces. Corporations wield 
economic clout, each level of government relies upon its sovereign 
regulatory authority, and the impacted populations assert legal rights and 
grassroots political influence. These power relationships produce 
problematic patterns: Governments chronically underenforce 
environmental standards, and the structure of resource extraction often 
enmeshes corporations with armed conflict or with dictatorial regimes that 
commit human rights violations.20
Moreover, the foundational structural complexities are reinforced by 
the socioeconomic realities of the modern energy industry. The supply of 
nonrenewable energy sources continues to drop,21 the production process 
and usage of the final products result in significant environmental and 
 19. See Robert Dufresne, The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, and 
International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 331 (2004). 
 20. For analyses of these issues in various disciplines, see, for example, ECOLOGICAL 
RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS: THE GLOBAL EMERGENCE OF RADICAL AND POPULAR 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (Bron Raymond Taylor ed., 1995) (providing an interdisciplinary analysis of 
global grassroots resistance to environmental degradation); MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: 
THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT (2001) (providing a political analysis of the relationship 
between resource scarcity and military conflict); Dufresne, supra note 19 (providing a legal analysis of 
the relationship between oil exploitation and internal armed conflict); Rebecca Hardin, Concessionary 
Politics in the Congo River Basin: History and Culture in Forest Use (World Res. Inst. Working Paper 
No. 6, 2002) (providing an anthropological analysis of the role that concessionary politics plays in land 
use that includes a discussion of struggles over mineral wealth).  
 21. The news continues to report new record prices. See, e.g., Perils at the Pump, THE 
ECONOMIST GLOBAL AGENDA, Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm? 
story_id=4268274&fsrc=nwl (describing the implications of rising prices). For a summary of the range 
of perspectives on when the world oil production will peak, see Robert L. Hirsch, Roger Bezdek & 
Robert Wendling, Mitigating a Long-Term Shortfall of Oil Production, WORLD OIL MAG., May 2005, 
available at http://www.worldoil.com/Magazine/MAGAZINE_DETAIL.asp?ART_ID=2594. A U.S. 
Energy Information Administration presentation, in an analysis it terms as relatively optimistic, 
predicts that world oil production will peak between 2021 and 2112. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LONG 
TERM WORLD OIL SUPPLY (2000), http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/presentations/ 
2000/long_term_supply/sld001.htm; see also John H. Wood, Gary R. Long & David F. Morehouse, 
Long Term World Oil Supply Scenarios: The Future is Neither as Bleak or Rosy as Some Assert 
(Aug. 18, 2004), http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/feature_articles/2004/worldoilsupply/ 
oilsupply04.html (a more recent article by the same authors); cf. KLARE, supra note 20 (examining the 
relationship between resource scarcity and military conflict).  
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societal externalities,22 and the burdens and benefits of the industry are 
inequitably divided.23 Each of these issues sows the seeds for conflict not 
only among the key actors in a particular venture, but also among the 
many entities that intersect with the energy production process globally.24  
As the above description illustrates, the state-corporate regulatory 
relationship infuses each of these dilemmas. Because corporations directly 
extract and process the raw materials to produce energy, many of the 
externalities result directly from their choices. Corporations operate under 
the auspices of nation-state and sub-state governments, however, and as a 
result, regulatory failures also play a crucial role in conflicts and in 
resulting environmental degradation, including greenhouse gas emissions.  
B. Corporations in the International Legal System 
These energy-specific challenges occur against a backdrop of broader 
uncertainty over what space corporations should occupy in the 
international system, which poses a second barrier to fostering corporate 
responsibility in the energy sector. In a formal legal analysis, states appear 
to be the dominant actors in the international system. The processes of 
both treaty and customary international law creation rest on the consent of 
 22. Numerous books and articles have detailed the environmental and human toll of the energy 
production process. See, e.g., IKE OKONTA & ORONTO DOUGLAS, WHERE VULTURES FEAST: SHELL, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA (2001) (detailing the environmental and human 
consequences of Shell’s oil extraction); Richard L. Ottinger, Energy and Environmental Challenges 
for Developed and Developing Countries, 9 PACE ENVT. L. REV. 55, 62–70 (1991) (exploring the 
unsustainability and environmental costs of energy supply strategies); Andrea Wang, China’s Energy 
Policy and Competing International Environmental Pressures, 2000 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 271, 273–75 (discussing the implications of China’s dependence on coal); Douglas John 
Steding, Comment, Russian Floating Nuclear Reactors: Lacunae in Current International 
Environmental and Maritime Law and the Need for Proactive International Cooperation in the 
Development of Sustainable Energy Sources, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 711, 718–21 (2004) 
(discussing environmental and safety concerns posed by Russia’s proposed deployment of floating 
nuclear reactors); Monti Aguirre, “The Chixoy Dam Destroyed Our Lives,” HUM. RTS. DIALOGUE, 
Spring 2004, at 20 (discussing the flooding of villages due to construction of the Chixoy dam and 
human rights violations against protesters). 
 23. See sources cited supra note 22; see also Dufresne, supra note 19, at 348–63 (analyzing the 
way in which state sovereignty over natural resources results in petroleum corporations having rights 
in opposition to the population); Judith Kimerling, International Standards in Ecuador’s Amazon Oil 
Fields: The Privatization of Environmental Law, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 294–314 (2001) 
(discussing environmental impacts and inequity towards indigenous peoples in Ecuador’s Amazon oil 
fields); Stephen J. Kobrin, Oil and Politics: Talisman Energy and Sudan, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
425 (2004) (describing the relationship between Talisman Energy and the human rights violations in 
Sudan, and the impacts of that relationship). 
 24. See KLARE, supra note 20 (describing the resultant resource wars); Dufresne, supra note 19 
(describing the ensuing internal conflicts). 
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sovereign states.25 The very existence of corporations—and the ability to 
bind them—similarly emanates from state (and sometimes sub-state) 
authority.26  
This simple model revolving around the nation-state is challenged by 
numerous conceptual approaches that acknowledge the complex relational 
structures that underlie the transnational legal system.27 Whatever 
theoretical version one chooses, the political and financial clout of non-
state actors and their interactions with governmental actors complicate the 
regulatory picture.28 Corporations often have immense resources—Shell 
Oil, for example, despite its failures in finding new oil fields, had a record 
 25. For an overview of state sovereignty and its role in the international legal system, see IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289–99 (5th ed. 1998); see also THE FLUID 
STATE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (Hilary Charlesworth et al. eds., 2005) 
(exploring the contours of the relationships among domestic and international legal systems); Becky 
Mansfield, Beyond Rescaling: Reintegrating the ‘National’ as a Dimension of Scalar Relations, 29 
PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 458 (2005) (arguing for the importance of engaging the role of the 
national); Murphy, supra note 16 (placing state sovereignty’s current status in historical context); 
Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of 
Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1318–19 (1996) (exploring intellectual property legal 
developments within evolving conceptions of state sovereignty); Antonio F. Perez, Review Essay, 
Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms Concerning Sovereignty in International Law, 14 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 463 (1996) (providing an analysis of how the Westphalian model of state sovereignty has 
evolved). I have previously analyzed the role of varying sovereignty regimes in the regulation of 
international environmental justice problems. See Osofsky, supra note 8, at 80–86.  
 26. For an analysis of the multiscalar architecture of U.S. corporate law, see Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation, 2 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 167 (2005). 
 27. Numerous theories exist to explain why states behave as they do, and whether their 
compliance with international norms should be regarded as evidence of international law as law. Some 
of the major approaches include transnational legal process, see, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996), transgovernmental network theory, see, 
e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and 
Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041 (2003); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of 
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 1 (2002), cosmopolitanism, see, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002) (explicating this theory in the context of transnational jurisdiction), 
compliance-based approaches to international law, see, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based 
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional 
Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679 (2003), and state socialization, see, e.g., Ryan 
Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and 
Normative Challenges, 54 DUKE L.J. 983 (2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence 
States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004). For a recently 
proposed integrated theory of the impact of international treaties on state behavior, see Oona A. 
Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 CHI. L. REV. 
469 (2005). For an overview of norm-based and interest-based theories, see OONA ANNE HATHAWAY 
& HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2005) 
(summarizing these different theories).  
 28. See Deva, supra note 10 (exploring the limits of current regulatory regimes). 
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2004 net income of $18.5 billion29—that allow them substantial influence 
over the process of law creation.30 Nongovernmental organizations’ 
involvement in norm creation and the resulting accountability concerns 
also have been well-documented.31 As a result of the disconnect between 
non-state actors’ formal roles and actual level of involvement, substantial 
debate has occurred over basic questions, such as: (1) What obligations do 
corporations actually have under international law? (2) What mechanisms 
exist to create compliance with those obligations? (3) How effective are 
those mechanisms and how could they be made more effective?32
In the context of fostering more environmentally and socially 
responsible behavior by energy corporations, these questions are 
complicated by the relational axes detailed in Part III.B.33 Although a 
consensus has emerged, for example, that corporations have direct 
obligations to avoid engaging in a limited set of human rights violations, 
questions—especially at the margin—of when their involvement with a 
governmental violator is sufficient to trigger liability or whether 
environmental harm reaches the level of a human rights obligation have 
 29. Mathew Carr, Shell Cuts Oil and Gas Reserves for Fifth Time (Feb. 3, 2005), http://quote. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=a4aFPhwVLAbY#. 
 30. For a discussion of the relationship between corporations and the international legal system, 
see sources cited supra note 10; see also TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK (A.A. Fatouros ed., 1994); TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL 
LAW (Seymour J. Rubin & Don Wallace, Jr. eds., 1994). 
 31. For assessment of the important role that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play in a 
range of international law contexts and how that role might evolve, see Steve Charnovitz, 
Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 331 (1996) (arguing that NGOs can play a constructive role in both policymaking and 
dispute resolution in the World Trade Organization); Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Nongovernmental 
Organizations in the Climate Change Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 115 (1998) 
(describing the diverse involvement of NGOs in international law and policy); Stephan Hobe, Global 
Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (1997) (surveying the role of NGOs in the international community); 
Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial 
Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 611 (1994) (analyzing the participation of NGOs in the proceedings of 
international tribunals); Patricia Waak, Shaping a Sustainable Planet: The Role of Nongovernmental 
Organizations, 6 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345 (1995) (exploring the role of NGOs in 
international environmental and development law and policy). Some scholars have raised concerns 
about the accountability gap as nongovernmental organizations gain power. See, e.g., Robert Charles 
Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case 
for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261 (2004) (arguing for greater formal regulation of 
NGOs); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the 
“Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957 (1996) (raising accountability concerns with 
NGOs). 
 32. The books and articles on corporations and nongovernmental organizations cited supra notes 
10, 30 and 31 explore each of these three questions, which I posed to participants when chairing the 
panel Corporate Compliance with International Law at International Law Weekend–West 2005. 
 33. See infra Part III.B. 
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been more controversial.34 Similarly, because the home and host countries 
both have regulatory claims regarding transnational energy production, 
issues arise about which judicial forum and governmental regulators 
would be most appropriate and effective for achieving compliance.35 A 
clear understanding of the state-corporate dynamic in each situation is thus 
critical to addressing and preventing the problematic behavior. 
C. Overlapping Regulatory Regimes 
The above-described dilemma of how to locate corporations is 
compounded by a third challenge, that of addressing the appropriate level 
at which to regulate them. In the law and economics arena, for example, 
scholars and policymakers have debated the extent to which the federal 
government, as opposed to state governments, should be involved in U.S. 
environmental regulation. Substantial disagreements exist over when 
market failures occur, what causes them, how environmental harms might 
be integrated into the cost of production, and what entity should serve as 
the primary regulator. Both theoretical and empirical accounts have 
invoked conceptual approaches, such as public choice theory, to argue for 
radically different outcomes.36
 34. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (summarizing the jurisprudence on direct corporate liability and corporate aiding and abetting 
liability). The opinion, and more specifically the holdings regarding corporate liability, recently 
survived a renewed motion to dismiss based on the new developments in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692 (2004), and Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003). Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), motion to certify 
appeal denied by 2005 WL 2082847 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005). 
 35. These issues are explored in the sources cited supra notes 22 and 23. 
 36. In the mid-1990s, the debate over the appropriate governmental level at which to regulate 
focused on whether state or federal environmental regulation was more likely to lead to a race to the 
bottom, but it often contained arguments based on public choice theory. Compare Kristen H. Engel, 
State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS 
L.J. 271 (1997) (arguing for the value of federal environmental regulation), Daniel C. Esty, 
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) (same), Joshua D. Sarnoff, The 
Continuing Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 
7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 225 (1997) (same), and Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race 
to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 
YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996) (same), with Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the 
Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV & YALE J. ON REG. 23 (1996) (arguing against extensive federal environmental regulation); 
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” 
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 7 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (same); Richard L. 
Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 
MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) (same); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International 
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) (same). More recently, the focus has shifted from race to 
the bottom arguments to public choice ones. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental 
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Resolving either that controversy or the value of public choice theory 
more generally is beyond the scope of this article. An extension of the 
regulatory debate to the context of the transnational energy industry, 
however, provides an illustration of the complexities involved. Depending 
on whether the home or host state was the more appropriate regulator and 
on the particularities of that state, public choice analyses might dictate a 
different model of governmental involvement. The background politics; 
structure of executive, legislative, and judicial power; and types of active 
non-state actors all impact the internal politics of influence.  
Recent literature on environmental regulation has already begun to 
explore these issues of overlapping regulatory spaces in the broader 
transnational environmental context. For example, William Buzbee has 
considered the role of spatial mismatches in over- and under-regulation of 
environmental externalities.37 Daniel Esty has engaged related issues by 
analyzing the way in which emerging technologies create regulatory gaps 
that require new institutional responses.38 Climate change litigation fits 
into this dialogue by manifesting multiscalar, multispatial regulatory 
dilemmas.  
The relationship between state and corporate power manifested in this 
litigation thus represents a complex geography. The structures of the 
energy industry and of the transnational regulatory process provide crucial 
obstacles to addressing problems of corporate responsibility. The Parts 
that follow propose a strategy for mapping these relationships and then 
explore the implications of such a map in the context of efforts to address 
energy’s externalities in judicial and quasi-judicial fora.  
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555–57 (2001). Public choice analysis 
has also been considered in the international law-making context. For examples of recent scholarship 
in this area, see Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition, 90 
GEO. L.J. 971 (2002) (exploring the implications of public choice theory for international cooperation); 
John K. Setear, Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 715 (2005) 
(comparing iterative and public choice perspectives on whether leaders will choose to rely upon 
treaties or customary international law, and concluding that the iterative perspective is more 
persuasive).  
 37. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 
89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003) (exploring what he terms the “regulatory commons problem”). Outside of 
this specific law and economics environmental federalism context, numerous other scholars have 
explored geographic issues in transnational and international law. See sources cited infra note 42. 
 38. Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 
(2004). 
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III. LOCATING PLACE AND SPACE IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
A web of place-based relationships lies at the core of the above 
account. The actors involved in transnational energy production—from 
states to corporations to nongovernmental organizations to individuals—
identify themselves with at least one bounded geographic entity. The 
externalities of the production process, such as localized pollution or 
climate change, involve specific impacts in particular places. 
An examination of adjudication regarding these externalities reveals 
ties between the spaces that structure the cases and specific places. The 
choice of parties, fora, and substantive law each connect the case or 
petition to particular localities. Such decisions are rarely neutral, but rather 
reflect comparative assessments of litigative potential that are tied to 
place. For example, whether comparisons occur at a subnational, national, 
or supranational level, some places are perceived as having stronger 
regulations, more will to enforce their regulations, or a more progressive 
judiciary than others.39
Furthermore, the process of litigation creates constrained spaces. 
Individuals and entities are defined as inside or outside of the categories of 
petitioner, respondent, and adjudicator. Judicial interpretation locates the 
boundaries of legislatively created statutes and of administrative 
regulations. These categories mold the power relationships occurring 
within the confines of a case. 
 39. Conflicts of law has a substantial literature on forum shopping issues. See, e.g., Zohar Efroni, 
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy: New 
Opportunities for International Forum Shopping?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 335 (2003) (exploring 
forum shopping issues in cyberspace); Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral 
Hazard in Forum Shopping, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2004) (arguing that conflicts law 
provides a “spontaneous order” that helps to address “the adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
inherent in forum shopping”); Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on International 
Forum Shopping, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 463 (2002) (introducing the forum shopping issues discussed in 
the symposium). Scholars also have debated how these differences affect commercial decisionmaking. 
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 36; see also, e.g., Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top? International 
Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 347 (1999) 
(analyzing the regulation of labor practices); Gary S. Guzy, Reconciling Environmentalist and Industry 
Differences: The New Corporate Citizenship “Race to the Top”?, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 409 
(2002) (arguing that an environmental convergence is occurring); Tamara L. Joseph, The Debate over 
Environmental Standards in the European Community: A Race to the Top Rather than a Race to the 
Bottom?, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 161 (1997) (arguing that competitiveness concerns have pushed 
standards up in the European Community); John T. Suttles, Jr., Transmigration of Hazardous Industry: 
The Global Race to the Bottom, Environmental Justice, and the Asbestos Industry, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 
1 (2002) (exploring international environmental justice issues raised by the asbestos industry).  
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This Part draws from the discipline of geography40 to present a model 
for unpacking the relationships that drive and limit transnational litigation 
to achieve socially and environmentally sound approaches to energy 
production. It argues that mapping adjudicative efforts to force corporate 
responsibility helps to unravel the complex layers of intertwinement 
described in Part II. A place-based analysis of actors and claims serves as 
a crucial tool for revealing the underlying power dynamics in these 
cases.41 It demonstrates a modified Westphalian geography in which states 
must navigate overlapping sets of relationships in order to regulate 
effectively.42  
 40. One of the relevant focuses of the geography literature is on the evolving interrelationship of 
place, space, and scale. This piece draws from concepts imbedded in both critical human geography 
and political geography, and particularly focuses on the dynamic between place and space in climate 
change litigation. For an introduction to critical human geography, see DEREK GREGORY, 
GEOGRAPHIC IMAGINATIONS (1994) (exploring issues of socialization and deep space); HARVEY, 
supra note 16 (providing a series of essays in critical geography developed over a period of years); 
EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHICS: THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL 
THEORY (1993) (engaging the critical spatial perspective on social theory and analysis in a series of 
essays). For an introduction to political geography, see A COMPANION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 
(John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell & Gerard Toal eds., 2003); JOHN AGNEW, MAKING POLITICAL 
GEOGRAPHY (2002); KEVIN R. COX, POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY: TERRITORY, STATE, AND SOCIETY 
(2002) (providing an overview of political geography); MARTIN IRA GLASSNER & CHUCK FAHRER, 
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY (3d ed. 2004); see also JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD 
POLITICS (2d ed. 2003) (providing an overview of geopolitics); SAUL BERNARD COHEN, GEOPOLITICS 
OF THE WORLD SYSTEM (2003) (same); KLAUS DODDS, GEOPOLITICS IN A CHANGING WORLD (2000) 
(same).  
 41. For an example of such an analysis, see NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE 
GEOGRAPHICS OF POWER 189–222 (1994) (comparing a mine closure in the town of Kimberley, 
British Columbia, with Re Mia and Medical Services Commission of British Columbia, [1985] 17 
D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Can.) and Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission), [1988] 30 
B.C.L.R.2d 1 (B.C. Ct. App.)).  
 42. For accounts of the intersection between law and geography, see generally Delaney, Ford & 
Blomley, supra note 16 (providing numerous perspectives on the intersection); BLOMLEY, supra note 
41 (mapping the intersection between law and geography); LAW AND GEOGRAPHY (Jane Holder & 
Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003) (engaging numerous intersections of law and geography through a series 
of essays). For geographic perspectives on various legal issues, see, for example, GEOGRAPHY, 
ENVIRONMENT, AND AMERICAN LAW (Gary L. Thompson, Fred M. Shelley & Chand Wije eds., 1997) 
(discussing how geography and environmental law influence one another in the U.S. context); RACE, 
SPACE, AND THE LAW: UNMAPPING A WHITE SETTLER SOCIETY (Sherene H. Razack ed., 2002) 
(exploring the relationships among place, race, and spatial and legal practices); OLEN PAUL 
MATTHEWS, WATER RESOURCES, GEOGRAPHY & LAW (1984) (engaging the relationship between 
geography and water resources law); Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the “Third 
World” in International Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000) (exploring how 
legal scholars have drawn from political geography and international law critiques of development to 
analyze race); Matthew R. Auer, Geography, Domestic Politics and Environmental Diplomacy: A 
Case from the Baltic Sea Region, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 77 (1998) (arguing that geography 
influences international environmental negotiation through its role in shaping domestic environmental 
regulatory institutions); Berman, supra note 27 (presenting a cosmopolitan perspective on 
transnational jurisdiction); Richard T. Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 843 (1999) (providing a geographic analysis of territorial jurisdiction); Jerry Frug, The 
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A. Connections to Place 
This Part explores the potential value of mapping ties to place in 
climate change litigation. For each type of actor and component of claims, 
this analysis provides insights into the underlying spatial categories and 
how they relate to one another. 
1. Geography of Actors 
A map of the key actors in litigation to address energy’s externalities 
reaches beyond a simple discussion of petitioners and respondents. As the 
deconstruction of individual cases in Parts IV though VI reveals, the 
structure of litigation requires characterizing similar facts in varying ways 
to fit applicable laws. Each action focuses on a very narrow account of the 
problem that includes a specific configuration of relevant parties. For 
instance, one of the national-level cases addressing the externality of 
climate change in the United States focuses on the U.S. EPA’s regulatory 
authority under the Clean Air Act,43 while another case directly engages 
corporate pollution as a public nuisance.44
By explicitly acknowledging each relevant actor’s relationship to place, 
this aspect of the inquiry provides a mechanism for understanding the 
broader context in which adjudication occurs and, in so doing, escapes the 
structural confines of litigation. This type of understanding is particularly 
critical in the context of the generation of transnational environmental 
problems like climate change that represent nontraditional variations on 
cross-boundary pollution.45 A geographic understanding of each actor 
reveals a fuller narrative of the case that exposes boundaries and strategic 
Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047 (1996) (arguing that urban policy at multiple levels 
of U.S. government promotes metropolitan fragmentation); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 
73 FORDAM L. REV. 2501 (2005) (exploring conceptions of spatiality in international and U.S. law, and 
its implications for Guantanamo detainees); Robert R.M. Verchick, Critical Space Theory: Keeping 
Local Geography in American and European Environmental Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 739 (1999) 
(applying critical space theory to transborder waste transportation and judicial standing in the United 
States and European Union). 
 43. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 2006 WL 1725113 (U.S. 
Dist. Col. June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120).  
 44. See Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
No. 04 Civ. 5669, available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2004/04-076.pdf.  
 45. Traditional cross-boundary pollution continues to pose significant legal challenges. For an 
analysis of the latest variation on the Trail Smelter dispute, see Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Deja 
Vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-
U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363 (2005). 
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choices. Through this account, the power dynamics infusing the litigation 
emerge.  
a. Petitioners 
The mapping of actors begins with an analysis of those initiating the 
litigative dialogue in most of the case studies: the petitioners who claim to 
be impacted by the externalities.46 Some cases contain an apparently 
straightforward geography of those harmed, by providing a tale of tangible 
injury in a specific locality. In the situation described in the Introduction, 
the physical manifestations of climate change in the Artic have translated 
into particular impacts on the Inuit. For example, thinning ice makes 
traditional travel routes more dangerous, and the ongoing changes in 
animal populations constrains their hunting. The Inuit thus can link the 
global phenomenon of climate change to localized claims about their lives, 
livelihoods, and traditional cultural practices.47  
These individual geographies form a complex web. The scope of global 
climate change means that many parties have a wide range of claims, as 
represented in the diversity of petitioners in the litigation discussed in 
Parts IV through VI. A variety of non-state and governmental actors, each 
based in a particular place, argue that they have both standing and a 
substantive basis to challenge greenhouse gas emissions.48 Any given 
group of petitioners represents a particular subset of those who suffer 
similar types of harm, and often a variation on their narrative could be 
retold in a different geographic context; for instance, low-lying island 
states could make parallel claims to those made by the Inuit.49  
 46. In general, the petitioners are the ones claiming injury from the externalities. One of the 
subnational cases involves the energy producers as the petitioners, however. In re Quantification of 
Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 47. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 48. See Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 
ENVTL. L. 1 (2005) (exploring standing issues with respect to climate change litigation under federal 
environmental statutes). The organization Climate Justice provides a summary of pending climate 
change litigation on its website. See Climate Justice, Cases, http://www.climatelaw.org/cases (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 49. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, 
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 843–76 (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/ 
wg2/pdf/wg2TARchap17.pdf. 
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b. Respondents 
A map of the entities involved in the production process, some of 
whom serve as respondents in adjudication over externalities,50 provides a 
converse image. A particular corporation generally extracts the natural 
resources and processes them into an energy source. That corporation is 
located in its place of incorporation, and to some extent, in every locale in 
which it operates.51 Because of the distribution of natural resources around 
the globe, often extraction occurs in a developing country52 through a 
partnership between a subsidiary of a multinational corporation and other 
local entities.53
The entities that regulate corporate behavior—from traditional 
governmental regulatory agencies to those involved in funding the export-
import process that allows the flow of goods and capital—are each located 
in a particular place, and have relationships that extend into other places 
that provide contrasting socioeconomic and political contexts. They serve 
as petitioners pushing for greater regulation in some contexts and 
respondents fighting these efforts to force regulation in others, and 
regulatory entities at different levels of governance occasionally oppose 
one another in a lawsuit.54 For instance, cities are among the petitioners in 
 50. In one case example, however, the corporations were in the role of petitioners. See supra note 
46 and accompanying text. 
 51. For a discussion of international regulation of transnational corporations, see 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 30 
(providing an overview of international legal efforts to regulate corporations); TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL LAW, supra note 30 (providing an overview of national law efforts to 
regulate corporations); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 52. The term “developing country” is used as a short-hand in this Article for countries with fewer 
economic resources that tend to have more nascent or unstable political structures. In the energy 
production process, there is often a large socioeconomic and political contrast between the parent 
corporation’s home country and the country in which extraction is occurring. More generally, 
however, a spectrum of development exists, and countries with very different histories and situations 
become lumped together by the terms “developed” and “developing.” The boundaries, moreover, are 
difficult to discern. Although I use the terms “developing country” and “developed country” 
throughout this paper, I thus acknowledge their limitations. 
 53. A legal picture of the relationship among the various entities involved in the partnership can 
become very complex. For example, depending on the relationship between the parent or subsidiary 
and the various governments involved, difficult sovereign immunity questions may arise. See Melissa 
Lang & Richard Bales, The Immunity of Foreign Subsidiaries Under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 353 (2004) (arguing for the appropriateness of a 
beneficial interest test in this context).  
 54. I discuss them in this category for convenience, and do not intend to imply that they are 
always in the role of respondents. 
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a U.S. suit against federal-level governmental entities providing assistance 
to overseas ventures.55  
As in the context of corporate actors, the divide between developed and 
developing countries becomes relevant to mapping of governmental 
bodies. For example, an entity providing political risk insurance may be 
based in a developed country but funding ventures based in a developing 
country.56 Moreover, distinctions between levels and branches of 
government abound, as represented in the wide range of regulators 
described in the cases of Part IV through Part VI.57
c. Adjudicators 
The geography of the entity adjudicating also serves as part of the 
litigation’s dynamics. Choices among fora almost always exist in the 
context of transnational energy production due to the above-described 
structure of the industry. The transnational and multiscalar dimensions of 
energy production result in substantial ambiguity about which forum is 
most appropriate.  
Strategic forum selection reflects a cyclical process. Potential 
petitioners weigh the various characteristics of particular fora, but their 
decision-making is constrained by the options themselves. The 
amenability of a particular forum reflects a variety of geopolitical and 
socioeconomic factors beyond the control of the parties.58 The decision 
does not occur in an idealized Rawlsian world,59 but rather mirrors the 
factors shaping the fora. 
Moreover, even in fora that reflect international standards for judicial 
independence and the rule of law, the adjudicators are still human beings. 
Their perspectives and instincts have been honed by their life experiences, 
which reflect their geography, broadly construed. Who they are is 
 55. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2002), available at http://www. 
climatelawsuit.org/documents/Complaint_2Amended_Declr_Inj_Relief.pdf.  
 56. This is the scenario in the German case against Euler Hermes AG. For a description of the 
case, see Climate Justice, German Government Sued Over Climate Change, http://www. 
climatelaw.org/media/german.suit (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 57. See supra Part IV. 
 58. The attempts to address the disaster at Bhopal exemplify these dilemmas. For an analysis of 
the geopolitical and socioeconomic forces making legal redress difficult in its aftermath, see JAMIE 
CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL (1993).  
 59. John Rawls proposed that a person structuring the social order should operate from behind a 
veil of ignorance that prevents knowledge of future social status. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
118–23 (rev. ed. 1999). Not only would such a veil be difficult to construct in our society, but those 
ordering society almost always do so from a privileged position.  
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inescapably intertwined with their place in the world, which includes not 
simply the localities with which they have had significant contact, but also 
their socioeconomic, political, and educational experiences. Even when 
judges are consciously acting as neutral adjudicators, they cannot fully 
divorce themselves from their individually constituted values and 
approaches to reasoning.60  
A place-based approach assists in an analysis of the particular 
regulatory role an adjudicator has been asked to play with respect to the 
petitioners and respondents. As described above, petitioners and 
respondents vary widely in litigation addressing the externalities of energy 
production. In the climate change cases which serve as the focus for this 
Article, governmental and nongovernmental entities serve on both sides of 
the relevant cases and reflect various levels of the regulatory process. 
Because the fora range from the subnational to the supranational, the 
dynamic between the adjudicator and the parties varies not only based on 
the changing structure of the parties, but also based on the changing 
structure of the fora. 
2. Geography of Claims 
The geography of claims in these lawsuits similarly goes beyond a 
detailing of legal arguments. The underlying facts and the application of 
law to those facts have their own connections to place that inform a 
deconstruction of power dynamics. For example, in the Victoria, Australia, 
subnational action involving the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station, the 
relevant facts involved localized coal burning contributing to a global 
phenomenon—climate change—which in turn has a multiplicity of local 
effects around the world.61 The lawsuit successfully relied upon state and 
national legislation to challenge limitations on the scope of a state-
appointed panel inquiry into environmental effects occurring under those 
laws. A place-based analysis of the claims in this lawsuit, as detailed 
 60. Several schools of thought, such as legal realism, have explored the impact of this 
subjectivity. The extent to which socioeconomic context and the qualities of the individual adjudicator 
matter remains controversial. For a historical discussion of the legal realism movement, see LAURA 
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–1960 (1986). For examples of more recent scholarly 
analysis of legal realism, see Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as a Theory of Law, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1915 (2005); New Legal Realism Symposium, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335. 
 61. Australian Conservation Found. v. Latrobe City Council, [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029 (Vict. Civ. & 
Admin. Trib. 2004). 
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further in Part IV.B.2,62 helps to unpack the subnational, national, and 
supranational elements of the situation and the relationships among them. 
Through a focus on the ties to place underlying the factual and legal 
claims in climate change lawsuits and petitions, this part of the inquiry 
allows for a more nuanced understanding of the litigation’s substance. As 
the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station situation exemplifies, facts and 
legal claims may map somewhat differently from one another and from 
key actors. An exploration of those differences reveals not only issues of 
characterization, but also structures of power that shape these struggles 
over energy production’s externalities. 
a. Facts 
A map of claims begins with the facts that underlie them. In any case, 
the legal claims only exist because of events that have occurred and may 
be continuing to occur. The facts become relevant to a geographic 
analysis, however, because of the dynamic between place and space that 
drives the interconnection between law and fact. Place does not simply 
determine whether a tribunal has and should accept jurisdiction, but also 
constrains which legal claims can be made. For example, the facts must be 
tied to the United States in particular ways for U.S. federal environmental 
law to apply,63 or to the City of Latrobe in Victoria, Australia, for relevant 
local, state, and national laws to be at issue in a claim.64
The above-described place-based analysis of key actors begins the 
process of mapping facts, as many of the facts relate directly to petitioners 
and respondents. But the geography of the facts may be more extensive 
than the description of the actors provides. For example, a recently filed 
case in the High Court of Nigeria alleges that gas flaring by oil companies 
violates constitutional rights and environmental law.65 The plaintiffs in 
this lawsuit not only live near the flaring and experience its extensive 
 62. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 63. For a discussion of the extraterritoriality of U.S. environmental law, see Paul E. Hagen, The 
Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Environmental Laws, SK046 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 151 (2005) (providing an 
overview); see also Browne C. Lewis, It’s a Small World After All: Making the Case for the 
Extraterritorial Application of the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2143 
(2004) (arguing for the extraterritorial application of the National Environmental Policy Act).  
 64. For an analysis of the geography of Hazelwood Mine and Power Station case, see infra Part 
IV.B. 
 65. Motion Exparte Under Section 46(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999; Order 1 Rule 2(3) of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure) [sic] Rules, Statement, 
Barr v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nig., No. FHC/CS/B/126/2005 (Nig. F.H.C. June 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring.suit/case.pleadings.20June2005.pdf 
[hereinafter Motion Exparte].  
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short-range effects, but also are vulnerable to localized environmental 
changes due to global climate change.66  
As in the Inuit case, however, the Nigerian plaintiffs are only one of 
the populations experiencing the localized effects of global climate 
change.67 These specific facts thus become representative of a broader 
geography. The links between U.S. and European energy companies, gas 
flaring in Nigeria, and dangerously thin ice on traditional travel routes in 
the Arctic68 begin to emerge through a geographic analysis of the facts in 
these lawsuits. This approach engages climate change as a phenomenon in 
which local behavior in one place causes local impacts elsewhere. 
b. Substantive Law 
The geography of the substantive claims intertwines with that of the 
facts, but may not be fully contiguous with it. Often the relevant law 
covers a broader geographic area that includes the area in which the facts 
are occurring. For example, the petitions to the World Heritage Committee 
requesting that particular sites impacted by climate change be put on the 
Committee’s danger list focus on the impacts of climate change in those 
places.69 The geographic scope of danger-listing, however, includes more 
than just those individual places.70 Similarly, Victoria’s Planning and 
Environment Act71 covers the whole region rather than just the City of 
Latrobe.  
A place-based analysis of the substantive claims gives critical insight 
into the power relations involved. It answers spatial questions about whose 
regulatory authority is being invoked on what grounds, and in so doing, 
reveals the levers of executive and legislative authority that undergird 
these suits. The substantive laws have been created through a particular 
place’s political process, and were crafted broadly or narrowly through 
geographically bound entities. In the Minnesota state court case over 
 66. Motion Exparte, supra note 65, Verifying Affidavit; see also THE CLIMATE JUSTICE 
PROGRAMME & ENVTL. RIGHTS ACTION, GAS FLARING IN NIGERIA: A HUMAN RIGHTS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC MONSTROSITY (describing the impacts of gas flaring on local 
communities through exposure to toxins and through resulting climate change). 
 67. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 49, available at 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/index.htm (discussing climate change impacts around the 
world).  
 68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 69. See infra Part VI.B. 
 70. For the list of world heritage sites in danger, see World Heritage Centre, World Heritage in 
Danger, http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=158 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 71. Planning and Environment Act 1987, No. 45/1987 (1987), (amended 2005), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/paea1987254/.  
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environmental valuation, for instance, the case hinged on whether the 
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission was appropriately implementing 
the state legislature’s will in including carbon dioxide among air pollutants 
that have a cost value associated with them.72
The court’s approach to the substantive legal claims similarly reflects a 
place’s tradition of judicial interpretation and receptivity to adjudicators 
making decisions that constrain externalities. In the Minnesota case, for 
example, the court deferred to the Commission’s order under a substantial 
evidence analysis.73 In another variation of balancing among branches, the 
administrative tribunal in the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station case 
exercised its interpretive authority regarding whether greenhouse gas 
emissions should be included as part of the category of “environmental 
effects” in a statute created by Victoria’s legislature.74
The substantive claims also provide insight into the petitioners’ 
decision-making processes, and so feed into the above analysis of the 
actors’ geography. Generally, the particular substantive claims filed 
represent only one potential characterization of the facts. The petitioners’ 
choice of claim is suggestive not just of strategy, but also of the 
constraints under which the petitioners operate and through which they 
view the situation.  
c. Procedural Law 
While the application of substantive law reveals the way in which 
places’ power dynamics result in assertions of regulatory authority over 
particular domains, the applicable procedural law demonstrates a place’s 
structuring of opportunities among the various actors. Procedure can play 
a role through statutes that provide particular procedural rights. For 
example, in the German case against Hermes Euler HG, an export credit 
agency, the nongovernmental organizations petitioning the court claimed 
that the federal Environmental Information Act gave them the right to 
information about the extent to which Hermes provides political and 
economic risk insurance to projects that produce greenhouse gases.75 The 
nongovernmental actors, which have both national and supranational 
 72. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 73. Id. at 802. 
 74. Australian Conservation Found. v. Latrobe City Council, [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029 (Vict. Civ. & 
Admin. Trib. 2004). 
 75. See Germanwatch & BUND, German Government Sued over Climate Change, http://www. 
climatelaw.org/media/german.suit/briefing.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
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presences, are relying on a law created by the federal legislature for 
leverage against the credit agency.  
Procedure more commonly enters into lawsuits, however, through the 
rules applicable to a particular forum, which must be complied with in 
every lawsuit and may be created at multiple levels of government.76 
Moreover, procedure is not simply used offensively by petitioners, but is 
also used defensively by respondents.77 For example, in the case brought 
against Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation for their failure to produce an environmental impact 
assessment as part of their process of approving assistance for overseas 
projects, respondents tried to move the case to Washington, D.C., a less 
convenient location for petitioners, and to challenge standing.78  
Because procedural issues are often outcome determinative—
adjudicating bodies generally do not reach the merits if they find a 
procedural defect79 and the level of deference to lower courts is often 
definitive on appeal80—the procedural statutes and rules represent a 
powerful assertion of governmental authority. The entities creating the 
statutes and rules are providing the parameters within which externalities 
can be challenged, as well as the tools for doing so. A map of the 
procedural claims thus provides a window into the political and social 
context in which the struggle over externalities is occurring.  
Together, these place-based relationships reveal the spatial matrix in 
which the actors and claims operate and the ways in which that structure 
shapes and constrains the role that such suits can play. These power 
dynamics that underlie the litigation provide insight into the possibilities 
for corporate responsibility in the energy sector.  
 76. For instance, filings in a civil case before the Central District of California must comply with 
both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with local rules. See Central District of California U.S. 
District Court, General Civil Filing Information, http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov (follow “Filing 
Procedures” hyperlink; then follow “General Civil Filing Information” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006).
 77. For examples of offensive and defensive uses of collateral estoppel, see Brian Levine, 
Preclusion Confusion: A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the Application of Collateral Estoppel to 
Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 435. 
 78. See ClimateLawsuit.org, Media Kit, http://www.climatelawsuit.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 
2006).  
 79. For example, if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it will not reach the merits.  
 80. In the climate change litigation context, the D.C. Circuit recently failed to reach the merits on 
the EPA’s denial of a petition asking it to regulate carbon dioxide emissions by motor vehicles under 
the Clean Air Act. It held that the “EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion under 
§ 202(a)(1) in denying the petition for rulemaking.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
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B. Spatial Implications 
The diversity of actors and complex power relationships represented in 
climate change litigation are a far cry from the state of the treaties that 
constituted the Peace of Westphalia, which established the dominant 
power of the nation-state through an agreement between governmental 
representatives who had “implor’d the Divine Assistance.”81 These shifts 
occurring in multiple legal contexts have led some to trumpet the death of 
the Westphalian model, as part of the larger debate over the extent to 
which the nation-state still matters in our globalized world.82  
Although factual disagreements certainly occur, scholarly views of the 
continued importance of nation-states often hinge on characterization of 
agreed-upon facts. Many entities other than nation-states matter in the 
modern global landscape, and non-state actors sometimes take on 
traditional governmental functions.83 This growing international civil 
society interacts in complex ways with the consent of sovereign states, 
which may or may not diminish their importance depending on one’s 
theoretical perspective.84  
The geography of these cases exemplifies this complex landscape. A 
wide range of actors representing a diversity of places interact through the 
modality of a lawsuit. And yet governmental regulatory authority in 
multiple guises plays a role in every suit, beginning with the tribunals 
acting as adjudicators. Although national governmental entities—in their 
varying roles as proponents or opponents of stronger limitations on 
greenhouse gas emissions—do not act alone, efforts to control the 
 81. Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their 
Respective Allies, Preamble, Oct. 24, 1648, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ 
westphal.htm [hereinafter Peace Treaty].  
 82. Such trumpeting would not be new. Numerous scholars have argued that the power of the 
nation-state is in decline. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY? 8 (1989); KENICHI OHMAE, 
THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES 12 (1995); Ali Khan, The 
Extinction of Nation-States, 7 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 197 (1992); John O. McGinnis, The Decline 
of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 903 (1996). But see W. MICHAEL REISMAN, Introduction to JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, at xiv (W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999); William H. Lash, III, The Decline of the Nation State in 
International Trade and Investment, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1011, 1025 (1996) (“To paraphrase Mark 
Twain, I conclude that accounts of the demise of the nation state are grossly exaggerated.”). 
 83. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text; see also Laura A. Dickinson, Government for 
Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 135 (2005) (exploring the implications of corporations taking on traditional functions 
of the armed services). 
 84. See supra note 82. 
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externalities of energy production through court action ultimately must 
rely upon their regulatory authority. 
A map of the climate change litigation reveals three sets of 
relationships that the regulator must navigate in order to be effective. Each 
of these dynamics alone provides complex spatial questions. Together, 
they represent a three-dimensional, intertwined morass that serves as a 
formidable barrier to effective regulation of energy production’s 
externalities. Diagram 1 attempts to visually capture those relationships in 
a simplified, two-dimensional representation. Each element of the 
diagram, pictured as a simple oval, is actually made up of the overlapping 
entities portrayed in Diagrams 2, 3, and 4 respectively.85
Diagram 1 
Axis 1 
Multiscalar 
Axis 2 
Multibranch 
Axis 3 
Multiactor 
 
Diagram 1 illustrates the intertwined axes that define the modified Westphalian terrain. 
1. Multiscalar: Supranational, National, and Subnational 
The nation-state is notably present in climate change litigation at every 
level of government. In subnational actions, many of the corporate and 
nongovernmental organization organizations are nationally based.86 The 
national level cases not only occur in federal tribunals, but also include 
 
 85. See infra Diagrams 2–4. The spatial model I derived from these cases has some similarities to 
the one presented by Anne-Marie Slaugher in A New World Order (2004). They both engage three-
dimensional, overlapping spaces, and our first two axes are describing the parallel types of 
relationships; I use multiscalar where she uses vertical, and multibranch where she uses horizontal. My 
focus within those two axes, however, is somewhat broader, with a more substantial engagement of 
nongovernmental and subnational actors. Moreover, our third axes differ quite substantially, as she 
looks at disaggregated international organizations, and I look at governmental-nongovernmental 
dynamics. See id. at 18–23. An in-depth analysis of the relationship between transgovernmental 
network theory and this model is beyond the scope of this Article. I plan to explore this relationship in 
more depth, however, in the theoretical, normative companion piece to this Article. 
 86. See infra Part IV. 
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governmental and nongovernmental national-level actors and invoke 
federal statutory and constitutional law.87 The supranational petitions rely 
upon treaties to which national governments are parties—the most 
traditionally Westphalian nation-state role—and include those parties 
either directly as respondents or indirectly as part of the proposed 
solutions.88  
And yet these nation-state-based regulatory elements exist in 
interaction with other levels of government in every case. Because the 
phenomenon of climate change occurs within multiple regulatory domains, 
the tribunals themselves represent different types of governmental 
authority. Moreover, each case provides a unique microcosm of the 
subnational, national, and supranational dynamics represented in the 
simplified Diagram 2 below. In asserting sovereign control over energy 
production’s externalities, nation-states thus collaborate—and sometimes 
conflict—with regulatory efforts at other levels of government. Although 
this litigation potentially serves as a regulatory gap-filler to address 
jurisdictional mismatches, it also embodies those spatial conflicts among 
governmental levels.89  
Diagram 2 
Subnational 
National Supranational
 
Diagram 2 illustrates the interrelated levels of governance at which the regulatory 
dynamics occur.  
 
 
 87. See infra Part V. 
 88. See infra Part VI. 
 89. William Buzbee extensively explored these mismatches in his article cited supra note 37.  
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2. Multibranch: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
The traditional Westphalian model relies upon national executive 
authority,90 but modern nation-states with at least somewhat democratic 
governance structures generally also imbue legislative and judicial 
branches with regulatory authority relevant to transnational problems, such 
as energy production’s externalities.91 These cases are no exception. Each 
one involves the invocation of judicial power, whether to regulate 
corporate behavior directly92 or to force or prevent another government 
entity from engaging in such regulation.93 The more common formulation 
in the case studies is the latter one,94 with the result that many of these 
cases represent regulatory battles among governmental branches, 
sometimes at different levels of government.95
These inter-branch dynamics, as illustrated by the simplified Diagram 3 
below, provide a second axis along which regulatory conflicts and 
confluence emerge. Although the push and pull among branches 
sometimes occurs at purely the nation-state level, in which case it can be 
viewed as within the Westphalian actor, the cases often include inter-
branch conflicts at multiple levels of government.96 These jurisdictional 
mismatches and resulting regulatory gaps97 become intertwined with 
dynamics among executives, legislators, and judges.  
 90. See Peace Treaty, supra note 81, art. CXIX. 
 91. For example, the U.S. Senate must ratify treaties, and the U.S. federal courts have interpreted 
the extent of the Executive’s foreign affairs powers. For an analysis of the relationship between 
international law and executive power, see Janet Koven Levit, International Law Happens (Whether 
the Executive Likes It or Not) (draft manuscript on file with author). 
 92. The national-level emissions case against U.S. power companies exemplifies this version, see 
infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text, as does in part the Nigerian case against oil companies, see 
infra notes 200–02 and accompanying text. 
 93. The other national-level emissions case, against the U.S. EPA, exemplifies this version. See 
infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text. 
 94. See infra Parts IV–VI. 
 95. The U.S. vehicle emissions case is the most dramatic example of intergovernmental conflicts. 
See infra Part V.B.1. 
 96. The vehicle emissions case most starkly exemplifies this phenomenon. For a mapping of its 
actors, see infra Part V.B.1. 
 97. See Buzbee, supra note 37, at 23–24 (exploring these mismatches in the context of 
environmental federalism).  
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Diagram 3 
Executive 
Judicial Legislative 
 
Diagram 3 illustrates the relationships among governmental branches that shape the 
possibilities for regulation. 
3. Multiactor: Governmental and Nongovernmental 
As if the convoluted dynamics among the first two axes were not 
sufficient to create a regulatory morass, the cases also contain a complex 
geography of nongovernmental actors which both force and resist 
regulation. These relationships among governmental and nongovernmental 
entities form the third axis along which nation-states must navigate in 
asserting their sovereign authority, as represented in simplified form in 
Diagram 4 below. The national and subnational governments play a key 
role in governing these nongovernmental entities, as a survey of the 
geographic structures of the nongovernmental actors indicates. For 
example, the nongovernmental organizations and the corporation involved 
in the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station Case are regulated by national, 
regional, and local governmental authorities.98  
Moreover, the actors themselves often overlap. The lines between 
corporations and nongovernmental organizations begin to blur as 
corporate greenhouse gas emitters form nongovernmental organizations to 
advocate on their behalf.99 As these different variations on 
nongovernmental, nonprofit organizations team with governmental entities 
on either or both sides of a lawsuit in which another governmental entity is 
adjudicating,100 the distinctions among those advocating, regulating, and 
 98. See infra notes 132–40 and accompanying text. 
 99. See infra notes 187–91 and accompanying text. 
 100. All of the case studies present some variation of this dynamic. See infra Parts IV–VI. 
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being regulated become less clear. And each of these entities relies upon 
individuals, who sometimes play a direct role in the lawsuit as well.101 
Governmental efforts at corporate regulation must navigate this 
convoluted terrain in order to be effective. 
Diagram 4 
Individuals
Corporations
Governmental 
Entities 
 
NGOs 
Diagram 4 illustrates the interrelated types of actors who comprise the categories of 
petitioners, respondents, and adjudicators.  
IV. MAPPING SUBNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
This Part and the two that follow map climate change litigation at 
subnational, national, and supranational levels. In dissecting this series of 
case studies, these Parts explore the implications of this adjudicative 
geography for broader issues of regulating energy production’s 
externalities.102 In so doing, these Parts do not aim to provide an 
exhaustive catalog of the ever-increasing list of cases engaging global 
climate change, but rather an exploration of representative cases that 
include a diversity of actors and legal claims.103  
 101. The Nigerian case and some of the World Heritage Committee petitions include individuals 
as petitioners. See infra Parts V.C.1., VI.B.1. 
 102. The Article’s aim is not to create a comprehensive summary of climate change litigation, but 
rather to explore the implications of it. In selecting cases for my in-depth geographic analysis, I 
focused on those that represented the diversity of substantive claims and the spatial variations within 
categories of substantive claims. 
 103. For a detailing of the range of pending climate change litigation, see Climate Justice, supra 
note 48.  
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The two subnational cases analyzed in this Part focus on whether it is 
appropriate for state or local administrative bodies to include greenhouse 
gas emissions in environmental assessments of corporations engaged in 
coal-based energy production. The first two sections explore ties to place 
in each case, and then the third section reflects on the geography of 
subnational climate change litigation. 
A. Environmental Cost Valuation: Challenge to the Minnesota Scheme 
At the direction of the state legislature, the Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission established interim environmental cost values for five air 
pollutants, one of which was carbon dioxide, which negatively impacts the 
environment primarily by contributing to global climate change.104 A trade 
association representing lignite coal producers, users, and suppliers 
challenged the inclusion of carbon dioxide, but the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals held in 1998 that the Commission’s order regarding carbon 
dioxide values was supported by substantial evidence.105 The decision thus 
provided judicial reinforcement of an administrative body’s 
implementation of legislative environmental regulation of corporations 
that produce electricity; this regulation remains in place today.106
1. Actors 
The relators listed in the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision for In re 
the Quantification of Environmental Costs107 included Western Fuels 
Association,108 Dairyland Power Cooperative,109 Minnesota Power and 
 104. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.2422 (2004); see also MINN. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 
ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES VALUES UPDATED THROUGH 2004 (2005), http://www.puc.state. 
mn.us/docs/eeupdate05.pdf (listing environmental externalities values in Minnesota for 1995 and 
2004). 
 107. 578 N.W.2d 4794. 
 108. “Western Fuels Association, Inc. is a not-for-profit cooperative that supplies coal and 
transportation services to consumer-owned electric utilities throughout the Great Plains, Rocky 
Mountain and Southwest regions. Serving a wide variety of public power entities ranging from rural 
electric generation and transmission cooperatives to municipal utilities, WFA offers its Members 
diverse and extensive expertise in coal mining, coal procurement and transportation management.” 
ANNUAL REPORT 2004: COAL IS WHERE YOUR POWER BEGINS, WESTERN FUELS ASSOCIATION 
(2004), http://www.westernfuels.org/pdf/WFA2004AnnualReport.pdf. It has an office in Colorado and 
an operations office in Wyoming. Id. Its Class A members are Basin Electric Power Cooperative 
(North Dakota), Sunflower Electric Power Corporation (Kansas), and Tri-State Generation & 
Transmission Association, Inc. (Colorado). Id. 
 109.  
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Light,110 Center for Energy & Economic Development,111 Northern States 
Power Company,112 Otter Tail Power Company,113 and Lignite Energy 
Council.114 All of these entities produce power and/or represent companies 
that produce power in Minnesota and the surrounding states, and many of 
them have a national-scale operation.115 They have both localized and 
With headquarters in La Crosse, Wis., Dairyland Power Cooperative is a generation and 
transmission cooperative (G&T) that provides the wholesale electrical requirements and other 
services for 25 electric distribution cooperatives and 20 municipal utilities in the Upper 
Midwest. 
 . . . . 
 Dairyland’s service area encompasses 62 counties in four states (Wisconsin, Minnesota, 
Iowa and Illinois). 
Dairyland Power Cooperative, System & Cooperatives, http://www.dairynet.com/about/system.html 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 110.  
Minnesota Power, a division of ALLETE, provides electricity in a 26,000-square-mile electric 
service territory located in northeastern Minnesota. Minnesota Power supplies retail electric 
service to 135,000 retail customers and wholesale electric service to 16 municipalities.  
 Superior Water, Light & Power (SWL&P) sells electricity and natural gas and provides 
water service in northwestern Wisconsin. SWL&P has 14,000 electric customers, 12,000 
natural gas customers and 10,000 water customers. 
Minnesota Power, Minnesota Power Facts, http://www.mnpower.com/about_mp/facts.htm (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2006). 
 111.  
The Center for Energy and Economic Development (CEED) is a non-profit group dedicated 
to protecting the viability of coal-based electricity. Working at the local, state, and regional 
levels, CEED communicates the truth about coal-conducting research, dispelling falsehoods, 
and educating the public and government officials about coal-based electricity’s importance 
to our way of life. 
Center for Energy and Economic Development, About CEED, http://www.ceednet.org/ 
ceed/index.cfm?cid=7504 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). Its national office is in Alexandria, Virginia. 
Center for Energy and Economic Development, Contact CEED, http://www.ceednet.org/ceed/ 
index.cfm?cid=7526 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 112. Northern States Power Company is headquartered in Wisconsin. “The Company's principal 
activity is the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. The Company distributes its 
electricity to approximately 230,000 retail customers in northwestern Wisconsin and in the western 
portion of the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.” Business.com Directory, Northern States Power 
Company Profile, http://www.business.com/directory/energy_and_environment/electric_power_ 
utilities/northern_states_power_company/profile/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 113. Otter Tail Power Company is headquartered in Minnesota. It has power plants and customers 
in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Otter Tail Power Company, Quick Facts, 
http://www.otpco.com/AboutCompany/QuickFacts.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 114. Although Lignite Energy Council is listed as a respondent at the beginning of the opinion, 
both its focus and the court’s reference to it later in the opinion as a relator suggest that the respondent 
designation was erroneous. See In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 795–96, 799 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998). Lignite Energy Council, based in North Dakota, aims to “maintain a viable 
lignite coal industry and enhance development of the region's lignite coal resources for use in 
generating electricity, synthetic natural gas and valuable byproducts.” Lignate Energy Council, About 
Us, http://www.lignite-energy-council.org/about/Index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 115. See supra notes 108–13. 
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broader scale interests in minimizing the cost of power generation, and 
hence want to limit the substances included in environmental cost 
valuation. 
The respondents listed in the Court of Appeals opinion included the 
Environmental Coalition,116 North Dakota, the Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission, the Minnesota Attorney General, the Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency, and the Minnesota Department of Public Service.117 All 
of the respondents are either nonprofit organizations or governmental 
entities that have both localized and broader scale interests in limiting the 
environmental impact of power generation and tend to be supportive of 
including greenhouse gases within the list of substances.118 The 
 116. The Environmental Coalition was referenced as a respondent at the beginning of the opinion, 
and a relator in the middle of the opinion. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d at 795–96, 
799. Given the brief submitted by the Environmental Coalition supporting the inclusion of carbon 
dioxide values, Initial Brief of the Environmental Coalition on Substantive Issues, In re Quantification 
of Envtl. Costs, MPUC Docket No. E-999/CI-93-583 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings Jan. 12, 1996), 
available at http://www.me3.org/projects/costs/ecbrf1.html, it is most logical to treat the Coalition as a 
respondent. “The Coalition was comprised of seven groups including: ME3 (Minnesotans for an 
Energy Efficient Economy), Institute for Local Self-Reliance, Izaak Walton League of America, 
American Wind Energy Association, Clean Water Action, American Lung Association, and the 
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy.” ME3, Environmental Costs of Energy and 
Electricity, http://www.me3.org/projects/costs/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). ME3 is a Minnesota-based 
nonprofit focusing on “the transition to a clean, efficient, and fair energy system.” ME3, About ME3, 
http://www.me3.org/me3descr.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). The Institute for Local Self-Reliance, 
based in Minnesota and Washington, D.C., focuses on achieving ecologically sound communities that 
participate with control in the global economy. See Institute for Local Self-Reliance, ISLR: A 20 Year 
Track Record Promoting Sustainable Communities, http://www.ilsr.org/20yrhist.html (last visited Feb. 
27, 2006). The Izaak Walton League of America has a national office in Maryland and a Midwest 
office in Minnesota. The League describes itself as “one of the nation’s oldest and most respected 
conservation organizations. With a powerful grassroots network of over 330 local chapters nationwide, 
the League is dedicated to promoting common sense solutions to protecting our country’s natural 
heritage and improving outdoor recreation opportunities for all Americans.” Izaak Walton League, 
http://www.iwla.org/ (last visited May 26, 2006). The American Wind Energy Association is based in 
Washington, D.C., and “promotes wind energy as a clean source of electricity for consumers around 
the world.” American Wind Energy Association, General Information, http://www.awea.org/ 
aweainfo.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). “The mission of the American Lung Association® is to 
prevent lung disease and promote lung health. The American Lung Association® is the oldest 
voluntary health organization in the United States, with a National Office [in New York] and 
constituent and affiliate associations around the country.” American Lung Association, About, 
http://www.lungusa.org (follow “About” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). The Minnesota Center 
for Environmental Advocacy is based in Minnesota and “uses legal action and legislative advocacy, as 
well as research, communications and collaborations to improve Minnesota’s environment.” 
Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy, http://www.mncenter.org/about.html (last visited Feb. 
27, 2006). 
 117. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d at 795–96. 
 118. See, e.g., Initial Brief of Minnesota Pollution Control Agency on Substantive Issues, In re 
Quantification of Envtl. Costs, MPUC Docket No. E-999/CI-93-583 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings 
Jan. 12, 1996), available at http://www.me3.org/projects/costs/pcabrf1.html (supporting inclusion of 
carbon dioxide emissions); Initial Brief of the Environmental Coalition on Substantive Issues, In re 
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governmental entities are based in Minnesota and neighboring states. The 
non-profit Coalition members range from those that are Minnesota-based 
to those that are primarily nationally based.119
The adjudicator was Judge Randall of the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals.120 That court heard the appeal after relators petitioned for a writ 
of certiorari, following contested initial and reconsideration proceedings 
before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.121 The decision-makers 
thus reflect a much clearer tie to local geography than the parties do. 
2. Claims 
The facts of the environmental cost valuation case reflect a multiscalar 
geography. The dispute was over an environmental cost valuation system 
that applied within Minnesota and just outside its borders.122 This limited 
range of the system itself provides the case with a subnational geography. 
The reason that carbon dioxide was included in that system, however, was 
to address a supranational problem. The facts of the case thus cross-cut 
scale through a subnational environmental scheme including a 
supranational environmental problem. 
The applicable law, however, is clearly subnational. Every statute and 
case relied upon by the court came from the Minnesota legislature and 
courts.123 For example, the judicial analysis of transnational data, such as 
the quality of the evidence in support of climate change, relied upon 
Minnesota’s judicial standards for the discretion of the Administrative 
Law Judge.124 The claims, as the state court system required, thus focused 
on where the judicial action was taking place rather than on the broader 
geography of the facts. 
B. Environmental Review: Expansion of Coal-Based Energy in Victoria, 
Australia 
In Australia, the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station, which 
contributes approximately twenty-two percent of Victoria’s base load 
Quantification of Envtl. Costs, MPUC Docket No. E-999/CI-93-583 (Minn. Office Admin. Hearings 
Jan. 12, 1996), available at http://www.me3.org/projects/costs/ecbrf1.html (same) 
 119. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 120. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 121. Id. at 796–97. 
 122. One of the contested issues was whether carbon dioxide values should apply 200 miles 
beyond Minnesota state borders. Id. at 801–02. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. at 800–01. 
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electricity, was running out of coal and wanted to add an additional coal 
field, which would allow the power station to operate through 2031.125 
The Minister for Planning approved a panel inquiry into the environmental 
effects of the proposal, but provided terms of reference that excluded the 
climate impacts from the use of coal to produce energy.126 Several 
environmental groups challenged this exclusion, and in October 2004, the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Administrative Division, 
directed the panel to hear submissions under provisions of the Planning 
and Environment Act127 on the greenhouse gas impact from the new coal 
field.128 Although the expansion ultimately went forward, the ruling 
resulted in the first Victorian greenhouse reduction deed,129 which 
establishes emissions caps, provides for surrender of some of Hazelwood’s 
coal, calls for set milestones and reporting requirements, and encourages 
development of renewable energy projects.130 Environment Victoria, with 
support from the Australian Conservation Foundation and Greenpeace, 
criticized this agreement as “window-dressing” on giving Hazelwood “the 
right to pump out vast amounts of additional greenhouse pollution.”131 The 
decision thus provided judicial forcing of administrative regulatory 
behavior with respect to the power station that provided the basis for 
innovative and controversial policy-making. 
1. Actors 
The petitioners before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
in Australian Conservation Foundation v. Latrobe City Council included 
the Australian Conservation Foundation,132 World Wildlife Fund (WWF)–
 125. Australian Conservation Found. v. Latrobe City Council, [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029 (Vict. Civ. & 
Admin. Trib. Oct. 29, 2004). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Planning and Environment Act, 1987 (Victoria, Austl.) (Act No. 45/1987), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/aul/legis/vic/consol_act/paeal987254/. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Deed, available at http://www.doi.vic.gov.au/DOI/Internet/ 
Energy.nsf/AllDocs/88831B7277C9437DCA25701B00248D59?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 7, 
2006). 
 130. See Fact Sheet 1, Greenhouse Gas Reduction Deed with IPRH, available at 
http://www.doi.vic.gov.au/doi/doielect.nsf/2a6bd98dee287482ca256915001cff0c/4c055e0941b77e73c
a2570740006aaa7/$FILE/Fact%20Sheet%201%20-%20Greenhouse%20reduction.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2006). 
 131. Environment Victoria, http://www.envict.org.au (follow “Climate Change” hyperlink; then 
follow “Hazelwood Power Station” hyperlink; then follow “Bracks’ condemns Victoria to Climate 
Change” hyperlink). 
 132. Australia Conservation Foundation is a national nonprofit, membership-based organization 
that has a head office in Melbourne and other offices around the country. It describes itself as 
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Australia,133 Environment Victoria,134 and Climate Action Network 
Australia (CANA).135 All four of them are Australian nonprofit 
environmental organizations. With the exception of Environment Victoria, 
the organizations have a primarily national or international geographic 
base; both WWF and CANA are national branches of international 
organizations, and Australia Conservation Foundation is a national-level 
organization. Although they all have a presence in Victoria and hence 
geographic ties to the subnational level, their agendas are mostly 
intertwined with broader national and international objectives.136
The other parties in the case included the Latrobe City Council; the 
Minister for Planning;137 and International Power Hazelwood.138 Although 
the governmental entities are both tied to the local geography of the 
plant—it is located in the Latrobe Valley—International Power 
Hazelwood is owned by a multinational company headquartered in 
London.139 The office of its Australian subsidiary, Australian National 
“Australia's leading national . . . environment organisation.” Australia Conservation Foundation, 
About ACF, http://www.acfonline.org.au/default.asp?section_id=1 (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). 
 133. WWF–Australia, which has a head office in Sydney and other offices around Australia, “is 
part of the WWF International Network, the world’s largest and most experienced independent 
conservation organisation [WWF] has close to five million supporters and a global network active [in] 
more than 100 countries.” WWF–Australia, About Us, http://www.wwf.org.au/about/ (last visited Mar. 
31, 2006). “With over 80,000 supporters, and active projects in Australia and the Oceana region, 
WWF works to conserve Australia’s plants and animals by ending land clearing, addressing climate 
change, and preserving and protecting our freshwater, marine, and land environments.” Id. 
 134. Environment Victoria, based in Carlton, Victoria, “is the state’s peak non-government 
environment organization.” Environment Victoria, About Us, http://www.envict.org.au (follow “About 
Us” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 135. CANA, based in Ultimo, New South Wales, “is an alliance of over 30 regional, state and 
national environmental, health, community development, and research groups from throughout 
Australia. . . . CANA was formed in 1998 to be the Australian branch of the global CAN network, with 
representative groups in over 70 nations.” CANA, About CANA, http://www.cana.net.au/index. 
php?site_var=10 (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 136. See sources cited supra notes 132–33, 135. 
 137. The Minister for Planning was represented by the Victorian Government Solicitor in the role 
of observer. Australian Conservation Found. v. Latrobe City Council, [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029 (Vict. 
Civ. & Admin. Trib. 2004). 
 138. “International Power is a leading independent power generation company with interests in 37 
power stations in 18 countries around the world.” International Power, The Company, http://www. 
ipplc.com/ipplc/thecompany/. 
International Power's Australian business region consists of the Hazelwood plant in Victoria 
and the Pelican Point plant in South Australia, together with the Synergen peaking units 
dispersed in South Australia.  
Computer Business Review Online, International Power plc, http://www.cbronline.com/company 
profile.asp?guid=C94E4191-2B68-4B5E-82F9-350FFF746264&CType=Background (last visited Feb. 
27, 2006). The company’s head office is in London. Id. 
 139. See Environment Victoria, Corporate Profile of Hazelwood Power Station, http://envict.org/ 
au/inform.php?menu=5&Submenu=475&item=492 (last visited Mar. 31, 2006); International Power, 
Contact Us, http://www.iplcc.com/iplcc/contactus/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
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Power, is located in Melbourne, Victoria.140 Like the other governmental 
entities, the adjudicator—the Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal—is also based at the state level. 
2. Claims 
The factual and legal claims in Australian Conservation Foundation v. 
Latrobe City Council reflect a similar dynamic. The facts revolve around 
the planning process for the development of a particular coal field located 
within the ambit of the City of Latrobe, which is within Victoria. The 
geography of the coal field and contested planning process is distinctly 
subnational. As in the environmental cost valuation case, however, the 
parties disputed whether the supranational environmental problem should 
be included in the subnational process.141
The claims and opinion of the Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal rely upon subnational and national law. The primary statute upon 
which the analysis focuses is Planning and Environment Act 1987, which 
was created by a subnational legislature.142 The case also references 
several other subnational statutes and one national statute.143 Although the 
ambit of applicable law is somewhat broader in this action—including the 
national—the case’s analysis, like the Minnesota one, has a different legal 
than factual geography. Subnational and national laws are applied not only 
to the subnational facts, but also to the supranational ones. 
C. Geography of Subnational Cases 
These cases’ geography reflects the fundamentally local and regional 
character of the legal structure in which they operate; the tribunals and 
governmental parties all have clear connections to the places in which the 
environmental assessments are occurring.144 The map of the non-state 
actors, however, indicates the broader implications of these cases and their 
interconnection with national and international power dynamics. In both 
cases, although most of the corporate and nongovernmental actors had 
 140. See International Power, supra note 139. 
 141. See Australian Conservation Found., [2004] V.C.A.T. 2029. 
 142. See supra note 127. 
 143. Id. 
 144. For an analysis of evolving state government approaches to climate change policy, see 
BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLICY (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1789 Osofsky book pages.doc8/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1826 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1789 
 
 
 
 
 
 
some connection to the locality in which the suit occurred, many of them 
were primarily nationally or internationally based.  
The scalar differences between the non-state actors involved in the 
regulatory process and those entities actually regulating illuminates a core 
challenge for local efforts to regulate the externalities of energy 
production. The pollution-producing behavior occurs within the domain of 
a locality or region. The transnational and national character of the 
industry itself and of the nongovernmental organizations that concern 
themselves with it, however, does not fit neatly within a locally focused 
regulatory scheme.  
The petitioners and respondents were aligned oppositely in the two 
cases,145 but the underlying geography of the actors in each case reflected 
the tension between the local character of the specific controversy and the 
transnational scope of climate change. The decision-makers and 
governmental parties all represented either the localities or states at the 
focus of the controversy, but the nongovernmental parties had a more 
complex geography. Although the corporations and nongovernmental 
organizations had significant ties to the subnational areas in which the 
disputes were taking place—and some were even locally or regionally-
based—many of these non-state actors had broader national or 
international agendas. The spatial center of gravity of the parties and 
adjudicators was arguably subnational—Minnesota or Victoria—but both 
sets of actors clearly reflected national and international tensions over 
appropriate regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. 
An analysis of the factual and legal claims in the two cases illuminates 
their geographic tensions even more starkly. In both cases, the facts have 
two distinct spatial elements: (1) the local environmental issue and (2) its 
interconnection with the supranational environmental issue. The 
applicable law, however, treats those facts through a primarily subnational 
lens. The focus of the legal analysis in each case was on the laws of 
Minnesota or Victoria, respectively.  
In sum, not only do tribunals grapple with complex, transnational facts, 
but they also engage parties whose center of gravity often is not locally 
based. In order for subnational tribunals to engage these cases effectively, 
they must bridge disparate geographies. These dynamics raise questions 
 145. The relators in the environmental cost valuation case were challenging a 
legislative/administrative determination to treat carbon dioxide emissions as pollution, whereas the 
petitioners in the land use case were pushing for its inclusion in an environmental assessment. 
Compare In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 796–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) with 
Australian Conservation Found., [2004] VCAT 2029.  
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about subnational tribunals as transnational judicial spaces and as actors in 
broader dialogue about climate change.146
V. MAPPING NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
The national-level cases present an even more spatially complex 
terrain. Geographic diversity infuses these cases, which gain a national-
level characterization primarily from the federal-level designation of the 
tribunal in which they are brought. Although the cases that follow often 
address interrelated substantive issues, each case involves a unique 
arrangement of place-based relationships.  
This analysis engages the national-level climate change cases that 
focus substantively on emissions reduction and project financing. The 
cases include a mix of public and private actors as plaintiffs and 
defendants, and represent a form of governmental regulation of 
corporations. Within each of the major substantive categories, 
significantly different formulations of actors, facts, and legal claims 
emerge. Because these cases are all brought at the same level of 
government and engage interrelated facts, however, a comparative analysis 
of their geographies is particularly useful. Paralleling the subnational 
analysis, this Part explores the contours of each case and then provides an 
analysis of the geography of national-level climate change litigation. 
A. Emissions Regulation: U.S. Power Companies 
Eight states and New York City sued six major power companies that 
contribute “approximately one quarter of the U.S. electric power sector’s 
carbon dioxide emissions.”147 They claimed that these emissions’ 
contribution to global warming injure public health, coastal resources, 
water supplies, the Great Lakes, and economic interests, as well as 
increase the risk of wildfires and catastrophic climate change;148 as a 
result, these emissions constitute a public nuisance in violation of federal 
common law, or, in the alternative, state law.149 The case was dismissed in 
September 2005 by the Southern District of New York on the grounds that 
 146. I explore these issues in more depth in Hari M. Osofsky, Local Approaches to Transnational 
Corporate Responsibility: Mapping the Role of Subnational Climate Change Litigation, PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. J. (forthcoming 2006). 
 147. Complaint at 1, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(No. 04 Civ 5669), available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2004/04-076.pdf.  
 148. Id. at 30–41. 
 149. Id. at 1–2. 
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it raised nonjusticiable political questions, due to the “identification and 
balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national 
security interests” requiring a policy determination by the political 
branches.150 This case thus represents an effort to use the judiciary to 
regulate the behavior of corporations through federal common law and 
state-level law, an effort that this federal judicial actor objected to on the 
grounds that such regulation was in the political branches’ purview. 
1. Actors 
The public nuisance case against the power companies presents the 
simplest geography of actors of the three emissions regulation cases. The 
petitioners include the states of California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, as well as the City of 
New York.151 They are all subnational governmental entities that claim to 
be bringing the action in order to protect their property and their citizens’ 
health, well-being, and natural resources.152  
The defendants include American Electric Power Company, Inc.,153 
American Electric Power Service Corporation,154 The Southern 
Company,155 Tennessee Valley Authority,156 Xcel Energy Inc.,157 and 
Cinergy Corporation.158 They are corporations involved in electricity 
generation processes that rely on fossil fuels. Their operations span several 
states within the United States,159 and they have an interest in minimizing 
 150. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
 151. Complaint, supra note 147, at 1.  
 152. Id. at 3–5. 
 153. American Electric Power Company, Inc. (AEP) is a corporation with New York citizenship 
and its principal place of business in Ohio. It generates electricity in Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 5. 
 154. American Electric Power Service Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AEP and has 
the same citizenship and principal place of business. Its functions include providing management and 
professional services to AEP’s electric utility subsidiaries. Id.  
 155. The Southern Company has Delaware citizenship, with its principal place of business in 
Georgia. It is a registered public utility holding company with several domestic subsidiaries that 
generate electricity in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi. Id. at 6. 
 156. Tennessee Valley Authority is a federal corporation, with its principal place of business in 
Tennessee. It directly owns and operates facilities that generate electricity in Alabama, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee. Id. at *. 
 157. Xcel Energy Inc. has both citizenship and its principal place of business in Minnesota. It is a 
registered public utility holding company with four domestic subsidiaries that generate electricity in 
Colorado, Minnesota, New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id. at 8. 
 158. Cinergy Corporation has Delaware citizenship, with its principal place of business in Ohio. It 
is a registered public utility holding company with two subsidiaries that generate electricity in Indiana, 
Kentucky, and Ohio. Id. at 9. 
 159. Id. at 5–10. 
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regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. The adjudicator is the Southern 
District of New York, a federal judicial entity that covers several 
counties—Bronx, Dutchess, New York, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, 
Sullivan, and Westchester—within New York State.160  
2. Claims 
The facts of this case present a multilevel geography. On the one hand, 
the emissions by the defendant corporations and their sub-entities are 
occurring in specific localities in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.161 Moreover, each of the defendants has 
citizenship in a particular state.162 On the other hand, the suit focuses on 
the emissions as a substantial portion of overall national U.S. emissions 
and on their contribution to the supranational problem of climate 
change.163  
The claims for relief are simultaneously national and subnational. 
Substantively, plaintiffs allege violations of the federal common law of 
public nuisance, and in the alternative, state law public nuisance.164 
Procedurally, they make federal law claims for subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction and for venue,165 some of which rely upon connections to a 
particular subnational area.166
B. Emissions Regulation: U.S. Vehicles 
Twelve states, three cities, a U.S. territory, and thirteen 
nongovernmental organizations are petitioners in a lawsuit under the 
Administrative Procedure Act and Clean Air Act against the EPA, ten 
other states, and nineteen industry and utility groups.167 The plaintiffs 
 160. See Southern District of New York, General Directory, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/ 
office.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 161. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Complaint, supra note 147, at 1. 
 164. Id. at 43–49. 
 165. Id. at 10–21.  
 166. For example, the venue and personal jurisdiction claims rely on the defendants’ connections 
to and activities in the Southern District of New York. Id.  
 167. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) , cert. granted, 2006 WL 1725113 (U.S. 
Dist. Col. June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120). For a full listing of parties, see International Center for 
Technology Assessment (ICTA), Global Warming Petitioners, http://www.icta.org/doc/global% 
20warming%20petitioners%20final.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter ICTA Parties Listing]. 
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challenged the EPA’s denial of a petition requesting that it regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under section 202(a)(1) of 
the Clean Air Act.168 Without reaching the merits, the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit ruled in July 2005 that the EPA acted within its 
discretion in deciding not to regulate the emissions,169 and the Circuit 
denied rehearing en banc in December 2005.170 Petitioners filed a Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court on March 2, 2006, 
which was granted on June 26, 2006.171 This case thus represents an effort 
by local and state executive branches and nongovernmental entities to use 
judicial authority to force regulation by a federal executive branch agency, 
an effort opposed by other state-level executive branch and corporate 
representatives; a federal appeals court denied the case out of deference to 
the discretion of that federal executive branch agency, a denial which is 
now under review by the Supreme Court. 
1. Actors 
A geographic analysis of parties in the consolidated suit against the 
EPA over its refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under section 
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act is far more convoluted, but reveals the 
scope and complexity of the power dynamics involved. The governmental 
petitioners include twelve U.S. states: California, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington; the U.S. territory of American 
Samoa; and three cities: Baltimore, New York, and Washington, D.C.172 
 168. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) , cert. granted, 2006 WL 1725113 (U.S. 
Dist. Col. June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120).  
 169. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 170. Massachusetts v. EPA, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 171. Massachusetts v. EPA, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 
3517 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2006), cert. granted 2006 WL 1725113 (U.S. Dist. Col. June 26, 2006)  (No. 05-
1120); see also Nick Miles, Top US Court to Take on CO2 Case, BBC NEWS, June 27, 2006, available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5118792.stm; Supreme Court to Hear Key Environment Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/26/washington/AP- 
Scotus-Greenhouse-Gases.html?hp&ex=1151380800&en=43ce6578058bddbf&ei=5094&partner= 
homepage. The questions presented in the petition for writ of certiorari are: “1. Whether the EPA 
Administrator may decline to issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy 
considerations not enumerated in section 202(a)(1). 2. Whether the EPA Administrator has authority to 
regulate carbon dioxide and other air pollutants associated with climate change under section 
202(a)(1).” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Massachusetts v. EPA, 2006 WL 558353 (U.S.) (No. 05-
1120). 
 172. ICTA Parties Listing, supra note 168; see also Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated 
Cases, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (No. 03-1361) (D.C. Cir. 2005), available at 
http://www.icta.org/doc/Petitioners'%20Final%20Brief%201.25.05.pdf.  
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The thirteen nongovernmental organizations that are also petitioners 
include Bluewater Network,173 Center for Biological Diversity,174 Center 
for Food Safety,175 Conservation Law Foundation,176 Earthjustice,177 
Environmental Advocates of New York,178 Greenpeace,179 International 
Center for Technology Assessment,180 National Environmental Trust,181 
Natural Resources Defense Council,182 Public Interest Research Group,183 
 173. Bluewater Network is a nonprofit organization based in San Francisco. See Final Brief for the 
Petitioners in Consolidated Cases, supra note 172, at iv; About Bluewater Network, http://www. 
bluewaternetwork.org/aboutus.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). Bluewater Network is a division of 
Friends of the Earth, id., which “is the U.S. voice of an influential, international network of grassroots 
groups in 70 countries,” Friends of the Earth International. Friends of the Earth, Who We Are, 
http://www.foe.org/about/whoweare.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 174. Center for Biological Diversity is a nonprofit organization based in Arizona, with other 
offices in New Mexico, California, Oregon, and Washington, D.C. It has 13,000 members nationwide, 
and it works to protect endangered species. Center for Biological Diversity, Fact Sheet, http://www. 
biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/aboutus/factsheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 175. Center for Food Safety is a nonprofit organization with a national office in Washington, 
D.C., and a West Coast office in San Francisco. It was “established in 1997 by its sister organization, 
International Center for Technology Assessment, for the purpose of challenging harmful food 
production technologies and promoting sustainable alternatives.” The Center for Food Safety, About 
Us, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/about_us.cfm (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 176. “Conservation Law Foundation is a nonprofit, member-supported organization with offices 
in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont.” Conservation Law 
Foundation, http://www.clf.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). It focuses on advocacy involving 
protecting the environment in New England. Id.  
 177. Earthjustice is a nonprofit law firm that works to protect the environment. Its national 
headquarters are in California, and it also has offices in Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, 
Washington, and Washington, D.C. See Earthjustice, About Us, http://www.earthjustice.org/about/ 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 178. Environmental Advocates of New York is a nonprofit organization based in New York State 
that works to protect the environment in the state. Environmental Advocates of New York, About Us, 
http://www.eany.org/aboutus/index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 179. Greenpeace is a nonprofit organization whose national headquarters are in Washington, D.C. 
It engages in advocacy throughout the United States and around the world. First Amended Compliant 
[sic] for Declaratory Relief and Writ of Mandamus or Other Order, at 7–8, Int’l Ctr. for Tech. 
Assessment v. Whitman, No. 02-2376 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2003), available at http://www.icta.org/doc/ 
CO2PetAmendCompliant.pdf.  
 180. International Center for Technology Assessment is a tax-exempt, nonprofit organization that 
is incorporated in Washington, D.C., and engages in advocacy at a local, state, and federal level 
throughout the United States. Id. at 2–5.  
 181. National Environmental Trust is a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., that 
provides public education campaigns on the environment around the United States. National 
Environmental Trust, About Us, http://www.net.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).  
 182. Natural Resources Defense Council is a nonprofit organization with New York headquarters, 
as well as offices in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Contact Us, http://www.nrdc.org/contactUs/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). It has over one 
million members around the United States and works on a range of domestic and international 
environmental issues. See Natural Resources Defense Council, About Us, http://www.nrdc.org/about/ 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 183. The U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) is a nonprofit based in Washington, D.C., 
with regional field offices in Massachusetts, Georgia, Louisiana, Arizona, and Hawaii. U.S. PIRG, 
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Sierra Club,184 and Union of Concerned Scientists.185 They are 
subnationally based, nationally based, and internationally based 
organizations engaged in environmental advocacy. Three additional 
nonprofit organizations filed amici briefs in support of the petitioners.186  
The parties aligned with the respondent are similarly diverse. In 
addition to the initial respondent, the EPA, ten states187 and three entities 
representing industry and utility companies188 intervened in the lawsuit in 
support of the respondent. The ten states were Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, 
Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and Texas. 
The industry intervenor-respondents were grouped into three coalitions: 
the Vehicle Intervenor Coalition,189 the CO2 Litigation Group,190 and the 
Contact Us, http://uspirg.org/uspirg.asp?id2=10359 (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). It was created by state 
PIRGs, which operate in numerous states around the United States. It works on environmental, 
consumer, democracy, and higher education issues. U.S. PIRG, About Us, http://uspirg.org/uspirg. 
asp?id2=10115&id3=USPIRG& (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 184. The Sierra Club is a nonprofit organization incorporated under California law that engages in 
advocacy throughout the United States and internationally. See First Amended Compliant [sic] for 
Declaratory Relief and Writ of Mandumus or Other Order, supra note 179, at 5–7.  
 185. Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) is a nonprofit organization with a national office in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, as well as offices in Washington, D.C., and Berkeley, California. “UCS is 
an independent nonprofit alliance of more than 100,000 concerned citizens and scientists. [It] 
augment[s] rigorous scientific analysis with innovative thinking and committed citizen advocacy to 
build a cleaner, healthier environment and a safer world.” Union of Concerned Scientists, About UCS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/ucs/about/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 186. ICTA Parties List, supra note 168 (listing Physicians for Social Responsibility, Indigenous 
Environmental Network, and REDOIL (Resisting Environmental Devastation on Indigenous Lands) as 
Amici for the petitioners). 
 187. See Final Brief for the Intervenor States of Michigan, Texas, Idaho, North Dakota, Utah, 
South Dakota, Alaska, Kansas, Nebraska, and Ohio, and the Amicus State of Indiana in Support of 
Respondent United States Environmental Protection Agency, Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (No. 
03-1361) (D.C. Cir. 2005), available at http://209.200.74.155/doc/StateIntervenorFinalBrief1-21.pdf.  
 188. For a detailed description of those three entities, see infra notes 189–91 and accompanying 
text. 
 189. The Vehicle Intervenor Coalition consists of four entities that represent companies involved 
in the automotive industry: the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (Auto Alliance), the National 
Automobile Dealers Association, the Engine Manufacturers Association, and the Truck Manufacturers 
Association. Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents, Massachusetts, 415 F.3d 50 (No. 03-
1361), available at http://209.200.74.155/doc/IndustryIntervenorRespondentsFinalBrief1-25.pdf. The 
Auto Alliance has its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and also has offices in California and 
Michigan. Auto Alliance, Contact the Alliance, http://www.autoalliance.org/about/contact.php (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2006). It “is a trade association of 9 car and light truck manufacturers including BMW 
Group, DaimlerChrysler, Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Mazda, Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche, 
Toyota and Volkswagen.” Auto Alliance, About the Alliance, http://www.autoalliance.org/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2006). “The National Automobile Dealers Association, founded in 1917 [with its main 
office in McLean, Virginia], represents more than 19,700 new car and truck dealers, both domestic and 
international, with more than 43,000 separate franchises.” National Automobile Dealers Association, 
About NADA, http://www.nada.org/template.cfm?Section=AboutNADA (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
“Since 1968, the Engine Manufacturers Association[, based in Chicago, Illinois,] has been the voice of 
the engine manufacturing industry on domestic and international public policy, regulatory, and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/3
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technical issues that impact manufacturers of engines used in a broad array of mobile and stationary 
applications.” Engine Manufacturers Association, Who Is EMA, http://www.enginemanufacturers.org/ 
about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). The Truck Manufacturer’s Association, based in Washington, D.C., 
represents companies “engaged in the design, development, manufacturing, marketing and sale of 
medium- and heavy-duty trucks, truck chassis and truck tractors.” Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-
Respondents, supra, Corporate Disclosure Statement at 2. Accord Truck Manufacturers Association, 
Who We Are, http://www.truckmanufacturersassociation.org/WhoWeAre.asp?id=2 (last visited Mar. 
1, 2006).  
 190. “CO2 Litigation Group is an informal organization of trade associations and business 
organizations formed to fund and conduct litigation concerning potential regulation of carbon dioxide 
emissions.” Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 189, Addendum at 1. It has 
twelve members with an interest in the litigation. Id., Addendum at 2–8. American Petroleum Institute 
is a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., with offices in twenty-seven state capitals. It 
represents over 400 oil and gas companies. American Petroleum Institute, About API, http://api-
ec.api.org/aboutapi/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). American Forest & Paper Association, based in 
Washington, D.C., “is the national trade association of the forest, pulp, paper, paperboard and wood 
products industry. . . . AF&PA’s members include manufacturers of over 80 percent of the paper, 
wood and forest products produced in the United States.” American Forest & Paper Association, 
About AF&PA, http://www.afandpa.org/Template.cfm?section=About_AFandPA (last visited Mar. 1, 
2006). American Iron and Steel Institute, based in Washington, D.C., “represents 19 North American 
steel mills.” Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 189, Addendum at 3. Accord 
American Iron and Steel Institute, http://www.steel.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). Business 
Roundtable, based in Washington, D.C., “is an association of chief executive officers of 
[approximately 160] leading U.S. corporations with a combined workforce of more than 10 million 
employees.” Business Roundtable, About Us, http://www.businessroundtable.org/aboutUs/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, based in Washington, D.C., represents 
“more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and regions. It includes hundreds of associations, 
thousands of local chambers, and more than 100 American Chambers of Commerce in 91 countries.” 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, About Us, http://www.uschamber.com/about/ (last visited May 26, 
2006). “Founded August 14, 1961 [and based in Alexandria, Virginia], the National Association of 
Convenience Stores (NACS) is an international trade association representing 2,352 retail and 1,991 
supplier company members. NACS member companies do business in nearly 40 countries around the 
world, with the majority of members based in the United States.” NACS Online, About NACS, 
http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/TopNav/About_NACS/default.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
“Seventy percent of its members sell gasoline and diesel fuel, which, in 2002, accounted for more than 
$280 billion in sales.” Joint Brief of Industry-Intervenor Respondents, supra note 189, Addendum at 5. 
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) “is the nation’s largest industrial trade association, 
representing small and large manufacturers in every industrial sector and in all 50 states. 
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the NAM has 10 additional offices across the country.” National 
Association of Manufacturers, Profile and Mission, http://www.nam.org/s_nam/sec.asp?CID= 
26&DID=24 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). National Petrochemical and Refiners Association is based in 
Washington, D.C., and its “members include more than 450 companies, including virtually all U.S. 
refiners and petrochemical manufacturers.” NPRA, Info on NPRA, http://www.npradc.org/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2006). “Founded in 1916 [and based in Skokie, Illinois, with an office in Washington, 
D.C.], the Portland Cement Association represents cement companies in the United States and 
Canada.” Portland Cement Association, About PCA, http://www.cement.org/pca/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2006). The Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America, based in Reston, Virginia, “is the 
premier national trade association representing independent chain retailers and marketers of motor 
fuel, both branded and unbranded.” Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America, About 
SIGMA, http://www.sigma.org/about/about.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). The Specialty Steel 
Industry of North America (SSINA), based in Washington, D.C., “is a voluntary trade association 
representing virtually all the producers of specialty steel in North America.” The Stainless Steel 
Information Center, About SSINA, http://www.ssina.com/about/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
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Utility Air Regulatory Group.191 These coalitions represent a wide range 
of local, national, and transnational entities involved in business generally 
and in the processes that lead to the release of greenhouse gases in 
particular.192 Congressman John Dingell of Michigan, the Washington 
Legal Foundation, and the State of Indiana also filed amici briefs on behalf 
of the respondents.193 The petitioners and respondents thus include both 
governmental and nongovernmental entities that span numerous 
geographies at multiple levels. 
The judicial actor in this case is a national-level court with a 
geographic tie to Washington, D.C. The adjudicator in the latest opinion in 
the case was the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.194 The adjudicator 
currently is the U.S. Supreme Court, also based in Washington, D.C., but 
serving as the highest court of the nation-state.195  
2. Claims 
Although they engage multiple spaces, the claims in the motor vehicle 
emissions case have a far more straightforward geography than the actors 
do. The facts involve the U.S. EPA’s denial of a national-level rulemaking 
petition under a national-level law, the Clean Air Act, to address emissions 
that contribute to the supranational phenomenon of climate change, which 
Based in Washington, D.C.,  
[t]he Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA) consists of 39 North American companies that 
operate 125 steel plants and employ approximately 40,000 people. The SMA also has six in 
countries outside of North America, comprising a total membership of 45 steel companies, 
worldwide.  
 The North American member companies of the SMA are widely dispersed 
geographically with 33 located in the United States, three companies in Canada, and three in 
Mexico. The [U.S.] companies are represented in the United States Congress by 122 
Congressional Districts within 37 states.  
 The SMA is the primary trade association for scrap-based electric arc furnace (EAF) 
steelmakers. 
Steelnet, The Steel Manufacturers Association, http://www.steelnet.org/about/index.html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2006).  
 191. The Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) “is a not-for-profit trade association of individual 
electric generating companies and national trade associations that participates collectively in 
administrative proceedings, and in litigation arising from those proceedings, that affect electric 
generators under the Clean Air Act.” Joint Brief of Industry Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 189, 
UARG Disclosure Statement at 1. UARG does not specify in its statement in the Joint Brief which of 
its members are participating in the consolidated proceedings. See id. at 1–2. 
 192. See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 193. For a full listing of parties, see ICTA Parties Listing, supra note 168. 
 194. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
 195. See SUP. CT. R. 10-16; sources cited supra note 171. 
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has localized effects at a subnational level.196 The substantive and 
procedural claims made by the petitioners rely upon national-level statutes 
to address these facts that range in scale. They argue that section 202(a)(1) 
of the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from motor vehicles, and that the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act does not preclude such regulation.197 They appeal based 
on the Administrative Procedure Act, and argue that the EPA acted 
arbitrarily in denying the petition.198 They claim that the court has 
jurisdiction based on specific provisions of federal statutes.199
C. Emissions Regulation: Nigerian Oil Companies’ Gas Flaring 
Eight individuals, each of whom lives in a different community 
impacted by gas flaring, sued six oil companies and the attorney general of 
Nigeria for violations of sections 33(1) and 33(4) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria—as reinforced by Articles 4, 16, and 24 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights—and of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act.200 They claimed that the gas 
flaring violates “their fundamental rights to life and dignity of human 
person,” and they requested both declaratory and injunctive relief.201 After 
the filing of this suit, the Executive Director of Environmental Rights 
Action/Friends of Earth Nigeria (ERA) was detained for two hours for 
questioning that included discussion of the lawsuit.202 In November 2005, 
however, the Federal High Court of Nigeria in the Benin Judicial Division 
granted declaratory relief, enjoined the gas flaring by Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Limited (Shell Nigeria) and the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and ordered legislative 
processes to begin amending a problematic statute.203 After the gas flaring 
continued, petitioners filed contempt of court proceedings against Shell 
Nigeria and NNPC.204 On April 11, 2006, the Federal High Court of 
 196. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d 50.  
 197. Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated Cases, supra note 172. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Motion Exparte, supra note 65, Statement at 1–2.  
 201. Id. 
 202. Climate Justice, Executive Director of Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth 
Nigeria (ERA), Detained for Two Hours at Lagos Airport (July 8, 2005), http://www.climatelaw.org/ 
media/bassey.detained.  
 203. Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Nigeria Ltd. et al., [2005]—F.H.C.N.L.R.—(Nigeria), 
available at www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring.suit.nov2005/ni.shell.nov05.decision.pdf. 
 204. Press Release, Shell Accused of Contempt of Court over Continued Illegal Gas Flaring, 
http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/press_releases/shell_accused_of_contempt_16122005.html. 
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Nigeria ordered Shell Nigeria and NNPC to end the flaring by April 2007 
and to appear before the court on May 31, 2006 with a detailed plan for 
doing so.205 This action thus is an effort by individuals, with the support of 
nongovernmental organizations, to use the federal judiciary to regulate 
corporations directly and to force regulatory behavior by the federal 
executive branch, a role that the judiciary decided to play in its November 
2005 and April 2006 orders.  
1. Actors 
The Nigerian gas flaring case represents yet another geographic 
variation. The plaintiffs are citizens of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and 
also members of eight communities within the Niger Delta State.206 As 
such, they connect to place at a national level through their citizenship and 
at a state and local level through their residence and longstanding 
community ties. In filing this suit, these individuals were supported by 
ERA, a Nigerian nongovernmental organization that is a chapter of 
Friends of the Earth International, an international nongovernmental 
organization.207
The defendants include one national-level governmental actor, the 
Attorney General of the Federation, and six corporations: Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Limited,208 Total/Fina/Elf Limited,209 
 205. Press Release, Shell Ordered to Appear by Nigerian Court, http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/ 
press_releases/shell_ordered_to_appear_by_11042006.html. 
 206. Those communities are Rumuekpe, Imiringi, Gbarain, Iwherekan, Eremah, Akala-Olu, 
Idama, and Eket. Motion Exparte, supra note 65, Verifying Affidavit at 1–2. 
 207. See Press Release, Climate Justice, Communities Sue Oil Companies to Stop Nigerian Gas 
Flaring (June 20, 2005), http://www.climatelaw.org/media/gas.flaring.suit; ERA, About Us, 
http://www.eraction.org/modules.php?name=About_ERA (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).   
 208. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) has offices in Lagos, 
Port Hartcourt, Abuja, and Warri. Shell Nigeria, Contact Us, http://www.shell.com/home/Framework? 
siteId=nigeria (follow “Contact Us” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
SPDC is the pioneer and leader of the petroleum industry in Nigeria. It has the largest acreage 
in the country from which it produces some 43 per cent of the nation's oil. The company's 
operations are concentrated in the Niger Delta and adjoining shallow offshore areas where it 
operates in an oil mining lease area of around 31,000 square kilometres. SPDC has more than 
6,000 kilometres of pipelines and flowlines, 87 flowstations, 8 gas plants and more than 1,000 
producing wells. 
Shell Nigeria, The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), http://www. 
shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=nigeria (follow “About Shell Nigeria” hyperlink; then follow 
“What We Do” hyperlink; then follow “Exploration and Production” hyperlink; then follow “Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC)” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). “Shell 
Companies in Nigeria are part of the Shell Group whose diverse activities contribute to the economies 
of over 135 countries.” Shell Nigeria, Structure, http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteID= 
nigeria (follow “About Shell Nigeria” hyperlink; then follow “Who We Are” hyperlink; then follow 
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Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited,210 Chevron/Texaco Nigeria 
Limited,211 Mobil Producing Nigeria Limited,212 and Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation.213 The first five corporate defendants are all joint 
ventures between major multinational oil corporations and the sixth 
defendant, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, that engage in oil-
related activities in the plaintiff’s communities.214 As a result, these 
“Structure” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 209.  
Total Fina Elf is one of the first world’s largest international oil companies. With operations 
in over 100 countries, Total Fina Elf’s activities cover the entire oil chain, from the upstream 
(exploration, development and oil and gas production) through to downstream (refining and 
distribution of oil products and international trading of crude oil and products). 
GROUPE BRUXELLES LAMBERT, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 25 (2001), available at http://en.gbl.be/ 
Images/9_2271.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). Elf Nigeria Limited is a joint venture between Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation and Total Fina Elf that “produces about 125,000 [barrels per day], 
from 12 onshore and offshore fields. ELF has its operational base in Port Harcourt.” Nigerian Oil & 
Gas Online, Major Joint Venture Companies, http://www.nigerianoil-gas.com/upstream/joint_ 
venture_companies.htm#ELF (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 210. The Nigerian Agip Oil Company, “[t]he fourth largest oil producer in Nigeria[,] is owned by 
[Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation] (60%), Agip Oil (20%), and Phillips Petroleum (20%). 
Current production is about 145,000 [barrels per day], from 146 producing wells. The company 
operates an export terminal at Brass, and has its operational base in Port Harcourt.” Nigerian Oil & 
Gas Online, supra note 209. 
 211. “Texaco, (now ChevronTexaco) has been involved in exploration and production of Nigerian 
crude oil resources since 1961. Over 473 million barrels of oil have been produced since operations 
commenced. Texaco has its operational base at Warri, and its headquarters in Lagos.” Id. 
 212.  
This is a joint venture [(JV)] that is now the second largest operation in the country. The JV 
also has the only condensate operation in Nigeria, and is owned by [igerian National 
Petroleum Corporation] (60%), and Mobil Oil (40%).  
 Most of Mobil’s production is from shallow water offshore fields, with its operating unit 
based in the southeast location of Eket. 
Id. 
 213.  
The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [NNPC] was formed in 1977 through the 
merger of some of the departments of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and the old 
Nigerian National Oil Corporation. The Corporation has sole responsibility for upstream and 
downstream developments, and is also charged with regulating and supervising the oil 
industry on behalf of the Nigerian Government. In 1988, the corporation was commercialised 
into 12 strategic business units. 
Nigerian Oil & Gas Online, The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, http://www.nigerianoil-
gas.com/upstream/npcc.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). Accord Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation, About NNPC, http://www.nnpcgroup.com/aboutus.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006), NNPC 
is headquartered in Abuja. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Contact NNPC, http://www. 
nnpcgroup.com/contactus.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).  
 214. The industry is dominated by six major joint venture operations managed by a number of 
well known multinationals, Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Agip, Elf, and Texaco. The production concessions 
are managed through joint venture companies, in which the Nigerian Government, through the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), holds about 60% shareholding. The foreign joint 
venture partners manage the operations, under a joint equity financing structure regulated by a Joint 
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corporate entities have local, national, and international connections to 
place.  
The Motion Exparte and the contempt of court proceedings were 
brought in the Federal High Court of Nigeria in the Benin Judicial 
Division,215 and that court responded to them.216 The decision-makers are 
part of the national government, but are based in the particular locality of 
Benin City.  
2. Claims 
Like the other two emissions cases, the Nigerian oil-company gas 
flaring case contained claims that connect to multiple regulatory levels. 
The facts focused on the local impacts of subnational gas flaring in 
particular communities. These impacts were framed, however, both in 
terms of localized pollution and in terms of the effect on these 
communities from the flaring’s contribution to the supranational problem 
of climate change.217 The legal claims relied upon both national and 
supranational law. Petitioners claimed a violation of Nigeria’s 
Constitution, as reinforced by articles of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights, as well as of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Act. They further argued that the federal statute authorizing the flaring, the 
Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, is unconstitutional.218  
D. Project Finance: U.S. Agency Assistance for Overseas Projects 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and four U.S. cities brought a lawsuit 
under the National Environmental Policy Act and Administrative 
Procedure Act challenging the failure of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States to produce 
an environmental impact assessment as part of the process of approving 
loans, insurance, and other assistance for overseas projects.219 Plaintiffs 
claimed, in particular, that these projects produce annual greenhouse gas 
emissions equivalent to almost two-thirds of U.S. annual carbon dioxide 
Operating Agreement. Nigerian Oil & Gas Online, Upstream, http://www.nigerianoil-gas.com/ 
upstream/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 215. Motion Exparte, supra note 65.  
 216. See supra notes 203–07 and accompanying text. 
 217. Motion Exparte, supra note 65, Verifying Affidavit at 4–6.  
 218. See id., Statement at 4. 
 219. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), Friends of the Earth, 
Inc., v. Watson, No. 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2002), available at http://www.climatelawsuit.org/ 
documents/Complaint_2Amended_Declr_Inj_Relief.pdf. 
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emissions, and thus provide a substantial contribution to global 
warming.220 In August 2005, the Northern District of California denied the 
defendants’ summary judgment motion.221 This case thus represents an 
ongoing effort to use the judiciary to force administrative compliance with 
federal-level legislatively created law with respect to funding corporate 
projects. 
1. Actors 
The petitioners in the U.S. project finance case include four local 
governmental entities—the cities of Boulder, Colorado; Arcata, California; 
Oakland, California; and Santa Monica, California—and two 
nongovernmental organizations, Friends of the Earth, Inc., and 
Greenpeace, Inc.222 Both of the nongovernmental organizations operate at 
a local, national, and international level, and are involved with other 
climate change litigation.223 The defendants are two individuals being sued 
in their official capacity as officers of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC)224 and the Export-Import Bank of the United States 
(ExIm).225 OPIC and ExIm are both nationally based governmental entities 
engaged in transnational financial operations. The lawsuit is before the 
San Francisco Division of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of California. The judge is thus an individual who functions as part of the 
national government, but has subnational ties to place. 
2. Claims 
The facts in the case against OPIC and ExIm also occur at multiple 
levels. OPIC and ExIm are engaging in national level assistance for 
 220. Id. at 2. 
 221. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. 02-4106, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 
2005). 
 222. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), supra note 219. 
 223. See supra notes 173, 179, 207 and accompanying text. 
 224. “OPIC is authorized by 22 U.S.C. §§ 2291 to 2200b [sic], a part of the Foreign Assistance 
Act. OPIC was created ‘[t]o mobilize and facilitate the participation of the United States private capital 
and skills in the economic and social development of less developed countries and areas.’ 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2191.” Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), supra note 219, at 5. It 
is a U.S. government development agency based in Washington, D.C. Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, http://www.opic.gov/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).  
 225. “ExIm is the official export credit agency of the United States. It offers working capital 
guarantees, export credit insurance, direct loans and loan guarantees to benefit U.S. exporters. It is 
governed by the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, 12 U.S.C. § 635.” Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), supra note 219, at 6. Its headquarters are in Washington, D.C. 
ExIm Bank, Contact Us, http://www.exim.gov/contactus.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
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projects occurring in localities in other nations. Both cities and specific 
individuals who are based in particular substate localities and are members 
of the nongovernmental organizations have claimed to be affected by the 
contributions of these projects to global climate change.226 The substantive 
and procedural legal claims rely on national level laws, but have 
subnational and supranational components due to the nature of the facts. 
Substantively, petitioners argued that OPIC and ExIm violated the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to conduct 
environmental review of the overseas projects.227 Procedurally, they 
claimed the court has jurisdiction and venue based on Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, but their venue analysis had subnational dimensions, such 
as the fact that at least one plaintiff resides in the court’s district.228
E. Project Finance: German Agency Assistance for Overseas Projects 
In 2003, Germanwatch and Friends of the Earth Germany (BUND) 
submitted a request for information under the Environmental Information 
Act regarding the support of energy production projects by export credit 
agency Euler Hermes AG, which provides economic and political risk 
insurance for exports to developing and transitional countries.229 The 
Ministry of Economics and Labour refused their request, and in June 2004, 
Germanwatch and BUND brought an action against the Ministry in the 
Administrative Court in Berlin.230 They claimed Hermes provides 
significant support for projects that produce substantial greenhouse gas 
contributions, and that the Act provides them with the right to this 
information so that they can insure it is taken into account in the decision-
making process.231 A first hearing took place in July 2005, and the court 
issued an order that constituted part of a settlement in January 2006; the 
order required the defendant to provide detailed information on the 
greenhouse gas implications of projects in the field of energy 
production.232 This case thus represents a successful effort to use the 
judiciary to force an administrative ministry to comply with a federal-level 
 226. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended), supra note 219. 
 227. Id. at 3. 
 228. Id. at 3–4. 
 229. Germanwatch & BUND, supra note 75. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. For relevant documents, see Climate Justice, Climate Impacts of German Export Credits to 
Be Disclosed, http://www.climatelaw.org/media/Germany (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
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legislatively created law in an effort to influence funding of corporate 
projects. 
1. Actors 
The petitioners in the German case, Germanwatch233 and BUND,234 are 
German nongovernmental organizations. They each have a subnational 
presence and ties to nongovernmental organizations operating in other 
countries and internationally. The respondent is the German Ministry of 
Economics and Labour (BMWA), a national-level government entity that 
is the lead supervisor of the activities of German export credit agencies.235 
The petitioners focused on this respondent because they sought 
information from one of the export credit agencies regulated by the 
BMWA, Euler Hermes AG (Hermes), which is a corporate entity active at 
both national and supranational levels.236 Petitioners brought the action in 
the Administrative Court in Berlin, and the judge is thus a representative 
of the federal government based in a particular subnational geographic 
location.237  
2. Claims 
The action against Hermes also reflects its national-level setting while 
incorporating subnational and supranational elements. The action focused 
on Hermes’ provision of export guarantees for German companies’ 
 233. Germanwatch is a nonprofit and nongovernmental North-South initiative with offices in 
Berlin and Bonn. It focuses on trade, environment, and North-South relations, and it networks with 
organizations in developed and developing countries. Germanwatch, http://www.germanwatch.org/ 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 234. BUND, the German branch of Friends of the Earth, began as a federation of pre-existing 
regional groups. It has 390,000 members who are active in 2,200 regional and local groups. BUND, 
http://www.bund.net/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 235. Germanwatch & BUND, supra note 75, at 1. 
 236. Id.  
Following the incorporation of Hermes in 2002, Euler Hermes has strengthened its 
international position and expanded its range of products. As the leading credit insurer in 
Germany, Hermes has built up key positions in Eastern and Northern Europe. It is also a 
leading player in the bonding and guarantees business.  
 A member of the Allianz Group, and a subsidiary of AGF, Euler Hermes benefits of [sic] 
the financial solidity to provide long-term support for clients. Throughout 2003, the Group 
integrated the name Euler Hermes in all its Business Units. Euler Hermes, today the world's 
leading credit insurer, employs 5400 staff members worldwide and has a market share of 
34%. 
Euler Hermes, The Specialist in Receivables management, http://www.eulerhermes.com/group/en/ 
who_we_are/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 237. See Germanwatch & BUND, supra note 75, at 1. 
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exports to developing and economically transitional countries, a 
transnational process. The nongovernmental organizations requested 
information regarding the insured projects’ production of greenhouse gas 
emissions—which contribute to supranational global climate change but 
occur in particular localities—from national ministries that supervise the 
activities of Hermes in Germany. The lawsuit resulted from those 
ministries’ denial of the request.238  
The legal claims have both national and supranational dimensions. The 
action asked the court to force the federal government to give the 
requested information, based on the Environmental Information Act of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The petitioners further relied upon the 
European Court of Justice’s interpretation of EU Directive 90/313, which 
has been transposed into German law by the Environmental Information 
Act.239 The Berlin Administrative Court’s January 2006 order engaged 
both federal and EU law, and also referenced guidelines developed by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.240
F. Geography of National Cases 
As in the subnational context, the map of the national cases uncovers 
complex relationships among place and space. Each of the five national-
level cases considered here presents a quite different formulation of 
parties, but they all have a scalar diversity among their actors that raises 
regulatory concerns. Petitioners range from state and city governments to 
nongovernmental organizations to individuals. Respondents include state 
and national governmental entities, as well as corporations and the 
organizations that represent them. These national level fora, with ties to 
particular subnational localities, are thus being asked to engage actors 
whose geography does not match their own.  
All of the national-level cases studied, regardless of subject matter, 
follow a similar spatial pattern with respect to their claims. Their facts 
contain subnational, national, and supranational dimensions. The resulting 
legal claims rely heavily on national-level statutes and cases, and outside 
of the U.S. context, on applicable supranational regional law.  
The national tribunals, like the subnational courts analyzed in the 
preceding part, are thus asked to play a bridging role in these cases. The 
 238. Id. at 1–2. 
 239. See id. at 2. 
 240. For links to the official opinion in German and the unofficial English translation, see Climate 
Justice, supra note 232.  
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courts face petitioners and respondents connected to subnational and 
supranational interests in addition to national ones; these parties notably 
include conflicting governmental entities. The facts range across 
geographies, and often subnational or supranational law becomes relevant 
to the legal analysis before these national-level courts.  
VI. MAPPING SUPRANATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
The pending supranational petitions involving the externality of climate 
change and its impacts currently focus on international human rights and 
protection of world heritage.241 These petitions are being brought by 
nongovernmental organizations and individuals with a state as the 
respondent, to the extent that there are respondents, but they also involve 
underlying corporate behavior. This Part maps the pending petitions and 
then analyzes the geography of the supranational actions. 
A. International Human Rights: Inuit Petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights  
The Inuit petition described in the Introduction242 was brought against 
the United States in the Inter-American Commission, which only accepts 
petitions against nation-state parties.243 Because energy production and 
use provide such a significant portion of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, 
the petition’s claims about the inadequacy of U.S. policy necessarily 
include its approach to regulating energy.244 The petition can thus be seen 
as an effort to force national policy, at both an executive and legislative 
level, with respect to climate change generally and to greenhouse gas 
emissions from the energy industry in particular. 
 241. Future actions to address climate change may also include claims regarding marine pollution 
in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and claims regarding illegal subsidies in the World 
Trade Organization. See ASIL 2006 Annual Meeting Proposal, Climate Justice: Unpacking 
Transnational and International Litigation (on file with author). 
 242. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 243. The phenomenon represented in the Inuit case of using human rights actions against state 
parties to induce governmental regulation of corporate actors is not confined to the climate change 
context. My interest in the state-corporate regulatory dynamic arose due to a prior project I completed 
on environmental rights. In the thirteen environmental rights actions in international and regional 
tribunals I considered in that study, which also analyzed cases in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, all of the cases were brought against governments, as “claims were not allowed against 
private parties. In ten of the thirteen cases studied, however, a private entity regulated by the 
government was the direct cause of the harm, and in another two of those cases [as in the Inuit case 
discussed in this Article], corporations appeared to play some role.” Osofsky, supra note 8, at 121–22. 
 244. See infra notes 250–51 and accompanying text. 
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1. Actors 
The international human rights action by the Inuit involves multiple 
geographies: The chair of a supranational nongovernmental organization 
that represents individuals in subnational localities petitioned a 
supranational organization against a nation-state. In particular, the 
petitioner is Sheila Watt-Cloutier with the support of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference, a nongovernmental organization representing the 
approximately 150,000 Inuit of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia.245 
It was brought “on behalf of all Inuit of the Arctic regions of the United 
States and Canada,”246 who are peoples that have multiscalar ties at the 
levels of their local communities, states, nations, the Artic region, and 
international organizations. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference’s Office of 
the Chair is located in Iqaluit, Canada,247 and it also has offices in each of 
the four countries in which the Inuit live.248 The respondent is the United 
States,249 which acknowledges that almost twenty percent of the world’s 
human-made greenhouse gases originate from within its borders250 and 
projects that its emissions will continue to rise.251 The petition is before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a regional human 
rights body that is an organ of the Organization of American States 
(OAS).252 The Commission members are elected by the OAS General 
Assembly and do not represent a particular country.253
2. Claims 
The claims in the petition involve facts that cross-cut geographies. The 
Inuit present evidence of harm occurring in specific subnational regions of 
 245. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=16&Lang= 
En (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). “The organization holds Consultative Status II at the United Nations.” 
Id. 
 246. See Inuit Petition, supra note 1, at cover page. 
 247. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Office of the Chair, http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index. 
php?ID=248&Lang=En (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
 248. Inuit Circumpolar Conference, supra note 245.  
 249. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 250. President George W. Bush, Speech Discussing Global Climate Change) (June 11, 2001), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html. 
 251. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2002, at 73 (2002), 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/usnc3.pdf. 
 252. See Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights arts. 2–3, Oct. 31, 1979, 
O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447 (IX-0/79), available at http://www.iachr.org/Basicos/basic15.htm; Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, What Is the IACHR?, http://www.iachr.org/what.htm (last visited Apr. 
7, 2006).  
 253. See id. 
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four nation-states and argue that this harm results from supranational 
climate change, to which the United States is a substantial contributor 
through its failure to regulate adequately.254 The petition claims that these 
harms violate rights articulated in the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man.255 The Commission interprets the rights in the Inter-
American human rights documents, however, based on broader 
international law and developments.256 The Commission thus will apply 
regional supranational human rights law, relying in part on other 
supranational law, to address facts that have subnational, national, and 
supranational elements. 
B. World Heritage Preservation: Danger List Petitions to the World 
Heritage Committee 
In November 2004, nongovernmental organizations and individuals 
filed petitions with the World Heritage Committee requesting that Belize’s 
Barrier Reef (Belize Petition), Peru’s Huarascán National Park (Peru 
Petition), and Nepal’s Sagarmatha (Everest) National Park (Nepal 
Petition) be placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, due to the 
impacts of climate change.257 They also filed a September 2005 report 
 254. Inuit Petition, supra note 1. 
 255. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the 
Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to 
Human Rights in the Inter-American system, OEA/Ser. L.V/I.4 Rev. 9 (2003). The United States is not 
party to the American Convention on Human Rights, see Signatures and Current Status of 
Ratifications, American Convention on Human Rights, available at http://www.iachr.org/ 
Basicos/basic4.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2006), but as a member of the OAS, it is represented by the 
Commission and has obligations under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. See 
Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, arts. 1–2, supra note 253 (indicating the 
rights covered by the Commission and that it represents all OAS members).  
 256. See, e.g., Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04 OEA/Ser.L./v/II.122, doc. 5 rev. ¶ 86 (2004), available at http://www. 
cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm: 
According to the jurisprudence of the inter-American human rights system, the provisions of 
its governing instruments, including the American Declaration, should be interpreted and 
applied in context of developments in the field of international human rights law since those 
instruments were first composed and with due regard to other relevant rules of international 
law applicable to member states against which complaints of human rights violations are 
properly lodged. 
 257. Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Belize Barrier Reef 
Reserve System in the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change and for 
Protective Measures & Actions (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/ 
UNESCO.petitions.release/belize.barrier.reef.doc [hereinafter Belize Petition]; Petition to the World 
Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of the Huascaran National Park in the List of World 
Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www. 
climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release/peru.huascaran.national.park.doc [hereinafter Peru 
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with the World Heritage Committee on climate change’s impact on the 
Great Barrier Reef in Australia (Australia Report) that details Australia’s 
obligations under the World Heritage Convention.258  
At its twenty-ninth session, in July 2005, the World Heritage 
Committee responded to these petitions and the report by acknowledging 
that “the impacts of climate change are affecting many and are likely to 
affect many more World Heritage properties, both natural and cultural in 
the years to come,” encouraging “all States Parties to seriously consider 
the potential impacts of climate change within their management 
planning,” and requesting that the World Heritage Centre organize 
collaboratively “a broad working group of experts” to prepare a report on 
these issues for the thirtieth session.259 In February 2006, organizations 
and individuals filed a similar petition regarding Waterton-Glacier 
International Peace Park, which is located in both the United States and 
Canada.260
If the World Heritage Committee agrees to add sites threatened by 
climate change to the Danger List, the sites will be able to access financial 
assistance from the World Heritage Fund as well as help with conservation 
planning.261 If intended to address the problems fully, however, such 
planning would not be able to follow the typical model because the States 
Parties concerned include many countries beyond the host country of the 
site;262 the nation-state in which the harm is occurring often is not a 
substantial contributor to global climate change and thus has little ability 
Petition]; Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Sagarmatha National 
Park in the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change and for Protective 
Measures & Actions (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO. 
petitions.release/nepal.sagarmatha.national.park.doc; see U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. World 
Heritage Comm., Decisions of the 29th Session of the World Heritage Committee (Durban 2005), 
Decision 29 COM 7B.a (Sept. 9, 2005), available at http://whc.unesco.org/ archive/2005/whc05-
29com-22e.pdf [hereinafter Decision 29 COM 7B.a]; Richard Black, UN Investigates Everest Threat, 
BBC NEWS, July 14, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ sci/tech/4682437.stm.  
 258. DONALD R. ROTHWELL, SYDNEY CTR. FOR INT’L AND GLOBAL LAW, GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND THE GREAT BARRIER REEF: AUSTRALIA’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WORLD HERITAGE 
CONVENTION (Sept. 21, 2004), available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/scigl/SCIGLFinalReport21_ 
09_04.pdf; see E-mail from Peter Roderick, Co-Director, Climate Justice Programme, to author (Aug. 
5. 2005) (on file with author). 
 259. Decision 29 COM 7B.a, supra note 257. 
 260. Petition to the World Heritage Committee Requesting Inclusion of Waterton-Glacier 
International Peace Park on the List of World Heritage in Danger as a Result of Climate Change and 
for Protective Measures and Actions (Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://law.lclark.edu/org/ielp/ 
objects/Waterton-GlacierPetition2.15.06.pdf.  
 261. See World Heritage Centre, supra note 70.  
 262. Id. 
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to address the situation beyond implementing localized mitigating 
measures. 
Like the planned legal action by the Inuit, the petitions to the World 
Heritage Committee are not aimed at the regulation of specific corporate 
actors. These petitions, by their nature, are not structured to include a 
respondent, though they generally specify who should be involved in 
addressing the danger. For example, the petition on the Belize Barrier Reef 
includes a request that the Committee assist “the Government of Belize 
and Non-Governmental Organizations in developing a program of 
immediate corrective measures for the Site.”263 These cases can be 
viewed, however, as an effort to put pressure on State Parties to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions, which States likely would achieve in part 
through the process of regulating emissions from the production and use of 
energy. 
1. Actors 
The actors in the petitions and report filed in 2004 with the World 
Heritage Commission have parallel geographies, each of which represents 
a slightly different variation of relevant actors.264 The Belize Petition was 
submitted by the Belize Institute of Environmental Law and Policy 
(BELPO), a nongovernmental organization incorporated in Belize, based 
on an idea presented at the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (E-
Law) 2002 annual meeting. The University of Florida/University of Costa 
Rica Joint Program in Environmental Law and its Conservation Clinic 
assisted in the construction of the petition, which also was aided by 
foundation support to the Joint Program and to E-Law.265 E-Law and the 
Climate Justice Programme, based in the United States and United 
Kingdom, respectively, advocated in support of the petition.266  
The Peru Petition was submitted by two Peruvian nongovernmental 
organizations and individuals affiliated with them. Foro Ecologio del Peru 
is a national network of nongovernmental organizations and citizens 
promoting sustainable development, and Carlos Antonio Martin Soria 
 263. Belize Petition, supra note 257. 
 264. The 2006 Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park petition also demonstrates a multiscalar 
geography, but is not reviewed in depth here. 
 265. Belize Petition, supra note 257. 
 266. See Climate Justice, UNESCO Danger-Listing Petitions Presented (Nov. 17, 2004), 
http://www.climatelaw.org/media/UNESCO.petitions.release; E-Law, Urge UNESCO to Review 
Climate Change Petitions, http://www.elaw.org/campaigns/info.asp?id=2929 (last visited Mar. 1, 
2006).  
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Dall’Orso is a Peruvian environmental lawyer who serves at its legal 
advisor.267 Foro Ciudades Para La Vida is a national network of 
nongovernmental organizations aiming to implement the principles and 
objectives of Habitat II and the Rio Conference, and Architect Liliana 
Miranda serves as its executive secretary.268 E-Law and the Climate 
Justice Programme also advocated for action on this petition.269
The Nepal Petition was submitted by an even larger group of 
nongovernmental organizations and individuals: The Forum for Protection 
of Public Interest (Pro Public), a Nepalese nonprofit affiliated with Friends 
of the Earth, as well as the Forum’s executive director; two Nepalese 
citizens who are accomplished mountaineers; International Public Interest 
Defenders, a nongovernmental organization based in Geneva; and a range 
of U.S. and European individuals served as the petitioners.270 As with the 
other two petitions discussed, E-Law and the Climate Justice Programme 
were both involved as proponents.271 The three petitions thus all resulted 
from the work of nationally based nongovernmental organizations, with 
the assistance of individuals, organizations, universities, and foundations 
based in the host countries and in the United States and Europe. 
The Australia Report was prepared by the Sydney Centre for 
International and Global Law, which is part of the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Sydney. The report had been requested by the 
Environmental Defender’s Office New South Wales (Ltd),272 CANA,273 
and Greenpeace Australia Pacific.274 It thus represents an initiative by 
 267. Peru Petition, supra note 257. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See sources cited supra note 266. 
 270. See Nepal Petition, supra note 257. 
 271. See sources cited supra note 266. 
 272. “The Australian Network of Environmental Defenders Offices Inc (ANEDO) consists of nine 
independently constituted and managed community environmental law centres located in each State 
and Territory of Australia.” Environmental Defender’s Offices, National EDO Network, 
http://www.edo.org.au/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). “The Environmental Defender’s Office [(NSW)] 
Ltd is a not-for-profit community legal centre specialising in public interest environmental law. We 
help the individuals and community groups who are working to protect the natural and built 
environment.” Environmental Defender’s Office, EDO New South Wales, http://www.edo.org.au/ 
edonsw (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).  
 273. For a description of CANA, see supra note 135. 
 274.  
Greenpeace International began in Canada in 1971 and today has a presence in more than 40 
countries across Europe, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific.  
 Greenpeace Australia was founded in 1977 and joined forces with Greenpeace Pacific in 
1998. Together we have more than 113,000 supporters who are the backbone of Greenpeace 
Australia Pacific. 
Greenpeace Australia Pacific, About Greenpeace, http://www.greenpeace.org.au/aboutus (last visited 
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nongovernmental organizations operating at a subnational, national, and 
supranational level, assisted by a subunit of a subnationally based 
university that focuses on supranational issues. 
Because of the structure of the petition process, there are no official 
respondents in any of the cases. Each petition, however, asks the 
Committee to involve the host country of the site, as well as to assist with 
both localized and international efforts to address climate change and its 
impacts.275 Similarly, although the Australia Report includes a disclaimer 
that “[i]t does not purport to provide any advice of a legal character 
concerning questions of Australian law” and “should not be relied upon 
for the purpose of any legal process or proceedings,”276 it analyzes steps 
that the Australian government needs to take with respect to climate 
change to comply with its obligations under the World Heritage 
Convention.277 The petitions and report are thus requesting action with 
respect to entities at subnational, national, and supranational levels. 
The Committee is an intergovernmental body created by the 1972 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage (World Heritage Convention).278 The Convention dictates that 
States Parties, with an equitable representation of regions and cultures, 
serve as the members of the Committee.279 The Committee has requested 
the establishment of a working group of experts—created collaboratively 
by the World Heritage Center, Advisory Bodies, interested States Parties, 
and petitioners—to address the risks posed by global climate change to 
World Heritage sites and to propose a management strategy.280 The 
decision-makers are thus nation-states acting within a supranational 
structure and being advised by expert individuals from around the world. 
Apr. 7, 2006) (emphasis omitted). The Australia Office of Greenpeace is based in Sydney, and the 
Pacific Office is based in the Fiji Islands. Greenpeace Australia Pacific, Contact Us, http://www. 
greenpeace.org.au/aboutus/contact_us.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). Other branches of Greenpeace 
have also been involved in climate change litigation. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 275. Belize Petition, supra note 257; Nepal Petition, supra note 257; Peru Petition, supra note 
257. 
 276. Australia Report, supra note 258, at 39. 
 277. Id. at 14–38. 
 278. Articles 8–14 describe the Committee in detail. Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage arts. 8–14, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151, 
available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf [hereinafter World Heritage 
Convention].  
 279. Id. art. 8. 
 280. Decision 29 COM 7B.a, supra note 257. 
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2. Claims 
The factual and legal claims in the petitions and report to the World 
Heritage Committee are geographically similar both to one another and to 
the ones in the Inuit case. The facts in each submission detail harm to a 
subnational resource, regulated by a State Party, which has been 
designated by a supranational body as belonging “to all the peoples of the 
world, irrespective of the territory on which they are located.”281 Each 
petition claims that supranational climate change is endangering the sites 
sufficiently to include them on a supranational danger list and to require 
steps to address the problem.282 The applicable law is the supranational 
World Heritage Convention.283 The claims thus involve the application of 
an international regulatory regime to multilevel facts. 
C. Geography of Supranational Cases 
Although the map of supranational cases reflects a similar spatial 
diversity to the subnational and national ones, the specific issues faced by 
the tribunals as a result are reversed. Namely, the supranational tribunals 
have a transnational perspective on the cross-cutting actors, facts, and 
claims, but must engage the subnational and national dimensions of them 
through governmental and nongovernmental entities at those levels. 
The space created by the tribunals, and in particular the limited 
standing they provide for non-state actors, further shapes the geographic 
picture. Even tribunals such as the ones considering the above petitions, 
which allow for petitions from non-state actors, only allow the actions to 
be brought against the nation-states which are parties to the treaties that 
constitute them.284 Moreover, beyond the general issues of the 
enforceability of international judgments that lack the state’s police 
powers behind them, many of the relevant tribunals have not been granted 
the power to provide binding judgments.285  
 281. World Heritage Centre, About World Heritage, http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/ (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2006). See World Heritage Center, World Heritage List, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2006).  
 282. See Belize Petition, supra note 257; Nepal Petition, supra note 257; Peru Petition, supra note 
257. See also Australia Report, supra note 258, at 1–6. 
 283. See World Heritage Convention, supra note 278, arts. 8–14. 
 284. See Osofsky, supra note 8, at 100 n.122 (citing provisions of several human rights 
conventions that provide this limitation).  
 285. For example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has limited direct 
enforcement powers. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights 
arts. 41–51, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.iachr.org/ 
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The geography of supranational climate change actions thus varies 
significantly from that of subnational and national ones. Although 
supranational actions aim at the same type of problems as the subnational 
and national cases, they generally involve individuals and 
nongovernmental organizations making claims against nation-states for a 
failure to regulate. This spatial structure—and the tribunals’ reliance on 
national-level and sometimes subnational-level regulatory power—shapes 
the possibilities for influence of actions on this level.  
VII. TOWARDS A REGULATORY MODEL 
The above maps provide insight into the existing regulatory terrain. 
Except in the case in which corporate entities and representatives attempt 
to limit regulation,286 the climate change litigation studied represents an 
effort to fill perceived regulatory gaps. The lawsuits provide a mechanism 
for many of the interested parties to engage regulatory questions more 
directly than legislative or executive decision-making processes generally 
allow. They also provide a space in which actors operating at different 
levels and from different branches can dialogue together.287
The flexibility and variety of judicial fora, however, also constrains the 
role of this litigation. The geography detailed in Parts IV through VI 
places decision-makers in the position of needing to make appropriate 
judgments in the same three-dimensional morass that confronts other 
actors.288 The complexity of these actions, combined with their novelty, 
creates a potential for confusion that adds to uncertainty over whether this 
type of litigation can serve as an effective regulatory tool. 
More fundamentally, this geography raises questions about whether 
regulatory gap-filling is the most useful way of viewing these efforts, and 
if so, how else these regulatory gaps might possibly be filled. The 
transnational treaty regime on climate change does not include the most 
significant greenhouse gas contributor—the United States—as a party to 
its more specific limitations.289 And even the agreement that provides 
those limitations, the Kyoto Protocol, has been criticized as insufficient.290 
Moreover, lawyers and policy-makers are still grappling with how to 
Basicos/basic3.htm (describing the functions of the Commission).  
 286. In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 287. See supra Parts IV–VI. 
 288. See id. 
 289. See Bush, supra note 250. 
 290. See, e.g., Martin Parry et al., Buenos Aires and Kyoto Targets Do Little to Reduce Climate 
Change Impacts, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 285 (1998) (criticizing the targets as insufficient). 
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translate a belief that climate change needs to be addressed into effective 
regulatory approaches. The most ambitious implementation measures at 
national and subnational levels often fail to meet their emissions reduction 
goals despite well-organized and focused efforts.291  
An engagement of these questions allows a necessary conceptual shift 
from describing the existing terrain to engaging its normative implications. 
This Part begins an exploration of these issues as a jumping off point for a 
companion article that sketches a proposed law and geography approach to 
transnational regulation of cross-cutting environmental problems like 
climate change. In particular, the geographic terrain represented by climate 
change litigation invites a normative inquiry into identity questions. At the 
most basic level, this terrain reframes how the litigation might be viewed, 
or in geographic terms, raises issues about the space the litigation should 
be viewed as occupying. An exploration of that space paves the way for a 
dialogue about other spaces underlying it, such as those occupied by core 
actors. Such an analysis also provides the basis for engaging the cultural 
discourse underlying those spaces.  
A. Transnational Litigative Spaces 
The literature at the intersection of international law and international 
relations regarding the process of making and enforcing transnational law 
provides multiple conceptions of the space that litigation occupies within 
it. For example, a scholar relying on a transnational judicial process 
approach would likely view climate change litigation as part of the vertical 
process through which “interaction, interpretation, and internalization” 
promote obedience to law.292 A transgovernmentalist might focus in on 
this litigation as an instance of nascent judicial globalization; although 
these tribunals do not directly interact, they collectively become part of the 
transgovernmental networks that undergird disaggregated sovereign 
discourse.293
 291. For example, despite Portland’s ambitious emissions reduction plan and per capita successes, 
its population growth has led to overall increases in emissions. See CITY OF PORTLAND & 
MULTNOMAH COUNTY, LOCAL ACTION PLAN ON GLOBAL WARMING (2001), available at 
http://www.sustainableportland.org/Portland%20Global%20Warming%20Plan.pdf; CITY OF 
PORTLAND, PORTLAND CLIMATE CHANGE EFFORTS (2003), available at http://www.sustainable 
portland.org/stp_Ptld_climate_sum_2003.pd; City of Portland Office of Sustainable Development, 
Sustainable Technologies and Practices, http://www.sustainableportland.org/stp_glo_home.html (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2006). 
 292. Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After 
September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2004). 
 293. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (describing this 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/3
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A law and geography approach to understanding the value and 
potential role of climate change litigation uses the ties to place and 
underlying spatial constructs—and their evolution over time—as a starting 
point for the normative inquiry.294 Choosing a framing—whether 
transnational judicial process, transgovernmentalism, or an alternative 
theoretical approach—defines the conceptual space this litigation occupies 
and, as a result, suggests how it should be valued. This process must 
originate from an understanding of ties to place and how that space 
engages them.  
The normative inquiry about climate change litigation as part of the 
process of transnational regulation would be thickened by exploring how a 
spatial model represented by a theoretical approach might map onto the 
geographic terrain represented and vice versa. Such an approach would 
engage the overlaps and disconnects among different approaches to 
litigative spaces, as well as questions of how this litigation should be 
viewed in the broader scheme of transnational regulatory governance. The 
insights from geography thus provide a framework for comparing existing 
theoretical approaches as defining narratives for climate change litigation. 
B. Key Actors and Litigative Spaces 
A disaggregation of the first inquiry leads the way to a second cluster 
of issues revolving around the actors that participate in climate change 
litigation. The actors’ geography reflects that they all have layered, 
evolving identities, and that this litigation provides a forum for a 
multifaceted interchange. Moreover, the petitioners, respondents, and 
adjudicators each occupy different—and often multiple—spaces on the 
interrelated axes of power described in Part III.B.  
The interchanges among key actors about multiscalar issues help to 
define how climate change litigation should be viewed. To the extent that 
there is a dynamic cycle among the actors and the process of litigation, an 
inquiry into the space this litigation should occupy helps to define our 
construction of the actors, which in terms helps to redefine the space. This 
nuanced dance, for example, forms a core part of the story that both 
transnational legal process and transgovernmentalism tell.295  
process in contexts of direct interaction); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role 
of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 
497–99 (2005). 
 294. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 295. See sources cited supra notes 27, 292–93. 
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Because those actors have ties to specific places that form a key part of 
who they are, a geographic understanding of transnational litigation 
provides a more specific account of its role. The actors connect through 
webs of space, place, and time, with climate change litigation serving as 
one mode of interaction among them. A focus on a geopolitical conception 
of the actors thus allows a more complete conception of the space that the 
litigation occupies. 
C. Identity and Culture 
With this inquiry into the spaces that litigation and its key actors should 
be viewed as occupying, questions of culture and identity emerge. The 
Inuit on whose behalf the Inter-American petition was filed, for example, 
are simultaneously members of indigenous peoples connected to specific 
localities with long-standing cultural traditions, citizens under multiple 
levels and forms of government, and members of a broader supranational 
organization representing interconnected indigenous peoples.296 Each of 
these identities is place-specific, but also locates the Inuit petitioners in 
multiple cultural dialogues. A definition of the spaces those petitioners and 
that petition occupy would be incomplete if not informed by that cultural 
content, which includes exploring cultural dissent embodied in the framing 
of and interaction through the petition process.297
Geography provides a theoretical terrain which helps to integrate the 
first two inquiries with this third piece. Cultural geographers, for example, 
engage the implications of the dynamics between local and global for “the 
relationships between identity, meaning and place.”298 A law and 
geography lens thus allows for dynamics among place, space, time, 
culture, identity, and law to interweave with the geopolitical analysis of 
the litigation and its actors. 
 296. For an analysis of the relationship, for example, between citizenship and identity, see Leti 
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); Leti Volpp, “Obnoxious to Their 
Very Nature”: Asian Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71 (2001). 
 297. For an exploration of a cultural-dissent approach to cultural conflict and its relationship to 
law, see Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN L. REV. 495 (2001); see also Madhavi Sunder, 
Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) (analyzing the interaction of law and culture in the 
context of women’s human rights activists who work in Muslim communities and countries). 
 298. Linda McDowell, The Transformation of Cultural Geography, in HUMAN GEOGRAPHY: 
SOCIETY, SPACE, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 146, 166 (Derek Gregory, Ron Martin, and Graham Smith 
eds. 1994). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss6/3
p1789 Osofsky book pages.doc8/11/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] THE GEOGRAPHY OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 1855 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
The complicated problems of regulating the transnational energy 
industry represent a significant departure from the primacy of state power 
at the time of the Treaty of Westphalia. Mapping climate change litigation 
provides a window into the power dynamics that influence the current 
regulatory process. Examining the whirling dervish of interested entities 
highlights the complexity of addressing these externalities, but it also 
provides a path for making progress.  
Despite the three-dimensional morass the spatial analysis unveils, 
much of the fundamental framework of state sovereignty and equality 
remains and can help shape a modern approach to effective transnational 
environmental regulation. In their legislative, executive, and judicial 
capacities, governmental actors are playing a critical role in shaping a 
transnational regulatory process and dancing between domestic and 
international law.299 An understanding of the multidimensional, 
intertwined relationships allows for more targeted, effective approaches to 
such litigation and broader questions of corporate responsibility. 
Achieving effective regulation rests on the ability to create strategies 
that incorporate the multiple dimensions involved. Such strategies must 
rely upon governmental power, but a thick version of this power that 
views the nation-state in context. As Part VII suggests, this Article’s 
descriptive analysis provides a context for a normative law and geography 
exploration of climate change litigation, its core actors, and issues of 
identity and culture. The interweaving of international law, international 
relations, and geography allows an engagement of this type of litigation as 
part of a broader dialogue about transnational regulatory approaches. The 
companion article that follows this one will build upon this piece’s 
analysis to explore these issues.  
 299. Scholarly debate continues over how much of the framework remains. See, e.g., sources cited 
supra note 82. The key role of nation-states in this litigation suggests that a workable model of 
transnational regulation must engage a thick version of nation-state regulatory authority, a version I 
plan to explore in more depth in the companion piece. 
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